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PETER BLAIR HENRY∗
Research on the macroeconomic impact of capital account liberalization finds few, if
any, robust effects of liberalization on real variables. In contrast to the prevailing wis-
dom, I argue that the textbook theory of liberalization holds up quite well to a critical
reading of this literature. Most papers that find no effect of liberalization on real vari-
ables tell us nothing about the empirical validity of the theory because they do not
really test it. This paper explains why it is that most studies do not really address the
theory they set out to test. It also discusses what is necessary to test the theory and
examines papers that have done so. Studies that actually test the theory show that lib-
eralization has significant effects on the cost of capital, investment, and economic
growth.
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1. Introduction
Acapital account liberalization is a deci-sion by a country’s government to move
from a closed capital account regime, where
capital may not move freely in and out of the
country, to an open capital account system in
which capital can enter and leave at will.
Broadly speaking, there are two starkly dif-
ferent views about the wisdom of capital
account liberalization as a policy choice for
developing countries.
The first view, Allocative Efficiency, draws
heavily on the predictions of the standard
neoclassical growth model pioneered by
Robert M. Solow (1956). In the neoclassical
model, liberalizing the capital account facili-
tates a more efficient international allocation
of resources and produces all kinds of salu-
brious effects. Resources flow from capital-
abundant developed countries, where the
return to capital is low, to capital-scarce
developing countries where the return to
capital is high. The flow of resources into the
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developing countries reduces their cost of
capital, triggering a temporary increase in
investment and growth that permanently
raises their standard of living (Stanley
Fischer 1998, 2003; Maurice Obstfeld 1998;
Kenneth S. Rogoff 1999; Lawrence H.
Summers 2000). Motivated in part by the
prospective gains from incorporating
Allocative Effciency arguments into their
economic policies, dozens of developing-
country governments from Santiago to Seoul
implemented some form of capital account
liberalization during the past quarter century.
The alternative view regards Allocative
Efficiency as a fanciful attempt to extend the
results on the gains to international trade in
goods to international trade in assets. The
predictions of Allocative Efficiency hold only
when the economy suffers from no distor-
tions other than barriers to free capital flows.
Because there are many other distortions in
developing countries, skeptics argue that the
theoretical predictions of the neoclassical
model bear little resemblance to the reality
of capital account policy. Dani Rodrik’s
(1998) provocatively titled article “Who
Needs Capital Account Convertibility?” best
characterizes this view.1 Rodrik’s empirical
analysis finds no correlation between the
openness of countries’ capital accounts and
the amount they invest or the rate at which
they grow. He concludes that the benefits of
an open capital account, if indeed they exist,
are not readily apparent, but that the costs
are manifestly evident in the form of recur-
rent emerging-markets crises.
In the wake of Rodrik’s polemic, evidence
seemingly continues to mount in support of
the view that capital account liberalization
has no impact on investment, growth, or any
other real variable with significant welfare
implications. For example, in his survey of
the research on capital account liberaliza-
tion, Barry Eichengreen (2001) concludes
that the literature finds, at best, ambiguous
evidence that liberalization has any impact
on growth. In another review of the litera-
ture, Hali J. Edison et al. (2004) survey ten
studies of liberalization and document that
only three uncover an unambiguously posi-
tive effect of liberalization on growth.
Finally, in their comprehensive survey of the
research on financial globalization, Eswar S.
Prasad et al. (2003) extend the Edison et al.
(2004) survey to fourteen studies, but still
find only three that document a significant
positive relationship between international
financial integration and economic growth.
Prasad et al. (2003) conclude that “. . . an
objective reading of the vast research effort
to date suggests that there is no strong,
robust, and uniform support for the theoret-
ical argument that financial globalization per
se delivers a higher rate of economic
growth.”
In contrast to existing surveys, this article
demonstrates that a critical reading of the
literature reveals that the textbook theory of
liberalization stands up to the data quite
well. It is true that most papers find no effect
of liberalization on growth. But these papers
tell us nothing about the empirical validity of
the theory. They perform purely cross-sec-
tional regressions that look for a positive cor-
relation between capital account openness
and economic growth, implicitly testing
whether capital account policy has perma-
nent effects on differences in long-run
growth rates across countries. The funda-
mental problem with this approach is that
the neoclassical model provides no theoreti-
cal basis for conducting such tests. The
model makes no predictions about the cor-
relation between capital account openness
and long-run growth rates across countries,
and certainly does not suggest the causal link
needed to justify cross-sectional regressions.
What the neoclassical model does predict
is that liberalizing the capital account of a
capital-poor country will temporarily
increase the growth rate of its GDP per
capita. The temporary increase in growth
matters, because it permanently raises the
888 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLV (December 2007)
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country’s standard of living. However, as it is
the increase in the level of GDP per capita
that is permanent—not its rate of growth—
theory dictates that one tests for either a per-
manent level effect or a temporary growth
effect. Testing for a permanent growth effect
makes no sense because capital accumula-
tion, which is subject to diminishing returns,
is the only channel through which liberaliza-
tion affects growth in the neoclassical model.
A small but growing branch of the litera-
ture takes the time series nature of the neo-
classical model’s prediction seriously. It does
so by investigating whether countries invest
more and grow faster in the immediate
aftermath of a discrete change in their capi-
tal account policy. In contrast to work that
looks for a permanent impact of capital
account openness on growth across coun-
tries, papers in the policy-experiment genre
find that opening the capital account within
a given country consistently generates eco-
nomically large and statistically significant
effects, not only on economic growth but
also on the cost of capital and investment.
While the policy-experiment literature
removes any serious doubts about whether
liberalization has real effects, its findings
raise more questions than they resolve. Are
the magnitudes of the documented effects
plausible? Do the transmission mechanisms
emphasized by the theory really drive the
results or are other forces at work? With their
focus on aggregate data, papers in the policy-
experiment genre do not have enough empir-
ical power to be of any use. Fortunately, a
new wave of papers demonstrates how to
make progress on these and other important
questions by using firm-level data. Analyzing
capital account liberalization at the level of
the firm instead of the country provides
greater clarity about the channels through
which liberalization affects the real economy.
Disaggregating the data also brings clarity
to the contentious debate on liberalization and
crises. Because there are many different ways
to liberalize the capital account, when trying
to determine whether liberalizations cause
crises, it is critical to specify exactly what kind
of liberalization you mean. At a minimum, the
distinction between debt and equity is critical.
Recent research demonstrates that liberaliza-
tion of debt flows—particularly short-term,
dollar-denominated debt flows—may cause
problems. On the other hand, all the evidence
we have indicates that countries derive sub-
stantial benefits from opening their equity
markets to foreign investors.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 presents an organizing theoretical
framework. Section 3 reviews the literature
on the cross-sectional approach to the macro-
economic effects of capital account liberaliza-
tion. Section 4 uses the framework from
section 2 to explain why the cross-sectional lit-
erature finds no real effects of liberalization.
Section 5 discusses the policy-experiment
approach to the macroeconomic effects of lib-
eralization. Section 6 discusses problems with
the policy-experiment approach. Section 7
reviews recent advances using firm-level data.
Section 8 examines whether liberalizations
cause crises. Section 9 concludes.
2. Capital Account Liberalization and the
Neoclassical Growth Model
This section illustrates the fundamental
predictions of the neoclassical growth model
about the impact of capital account liberal-
ization on a developing country. The frame-
work is not novel, but it brings clarity to the
discussion of the empirical literature that
follows in section 3.
Assume that output is produced using cap-
ital, labor, and a Cobb–Douglas production
function with labor-augmenting technological
progress:
(1)        .
Let k = A⎯
K
L be the amount of capital per
unit of effective labor and y = A
Y
⎯L the amount
of output per unit of effective labor. Using
this notation and the homogeneity of the
production function we have:
Y F K AL K AL= ( ) = ( ) −, α α1
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(2)                  .
Let s denote the fraction of national
income that is saved each period and
assume that capital depreciates at the rate δ,
the labor force grows at the rate n, and total
factor productivity grows at the rate g.
Saving each period builds up the national
capital stock and helps to make capital more
abundant. Depreciation, a growing popula-
tion, and rising total factor productivity all
work in the other direction making capital
less abundant. The following equation sum-
marizes the net effect of all these forces on
the evolution of capital per unit of effective
labor:
(3)     k
.
(t) .
When k
.
(t) = 0, the economy is in the steady
state depicted by point A in figure 1. At
point A, the ratio of capital to effective labor
(k) is constant. In contrast, the steady-state
level of capital (K) is not constant, but grow-
ing at the rate n + g. Output per worker (Y−L)
grows at the rate g. Finally, the steady state
marginal product of capital equals the interest
rate plus the depreciation rate:
sf k t n g k t( )= ( ) − + +( ) ( )δ
y f k k= ( ) = α (4)               .
Equation (4) gives a general expression of
the equilibrium condition for investment.
This equation has important implications for
the dynamics of a country’s investment and
growth in the aftermath of capital account
liberalization because the impact of liberal-
ization works through the cost of capital. Let
r∗ denote the exogenously given world inter-
est rate. The standard assumption in the lit-
erature is that r∗ is less than r because the
rest of the world has more capital per unit of
effective labor than the developing country.
It is also standard to assume that the devel-
oping country is small, which means that
nothing it does affects world prices.
Under these assumptions, when the
developing country liberalizes, capital surges
in to exploit the difference between the
world interest rate and the country’s rate of
return to capital. The absence of any fric-
tions in the model means that the country’s
ratio of capital to effective labor jumps
immediately to its postliberalization, steady-
state level. Figure 1 depicts this jump as a
rightward shift of the vertical dashed line
′ = +f k rs state( ). δ
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Figure 1. Capital Account Liberalization in the Neoclassical Growth Model
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from ks.state to k∗s.state. In the postliberaliza-
tion steady state, the marginal product of
capital equals the world interest rate plus the
rate of depreciation:
(5)               .
On the one hand, the immediate jump to
the new steady state illustrates the problem
with cross-sectional regressions writ large:
instantaneous convergence generates a one-
time spike in the growth rate of output per
worker in the year of liberalization followed
by a return to normalcy in all subsequent
years. Cross-sectional regressions designed to
measure long-run differences in growth rates
across countries are ill-suited to detect the
short-lived changes implied by instantaneous
convergence.
On the other hand, it is reasonable to
regard instantaneous convergence as an
unattractive feature of the model rather
than a serious practical challenge to the
cross-sectional regression approach. Section
4.1 demonstrates in detail that the inability
of cross-sectional studies to detect the
impact of liberalization on growth remains a
problem under slower, more realistic speeds
of transition. For now, the vital point to note
is that, during the country’s transition to the
postliberalization steady state, the capital
stock grows faster than it did before the tran-
sition. To see why, recall that in the preliber-
alization steady state the ratio of capital to
effective labor (ks.state) is constant and the
stock of capital (K) grows at the rate n + g. In
the postliberalization steady state, the ratio
of capital to effective labor (k∗s.state) is also
constant and the capital stock once again
grows at the rate n + g. However, because
k∗s.state > ks.state, it follows that the growth
rate of K exceeds n + g during the transition.
The temporary increase in the growth rate
of capital has implications for economic
growth through the formula for the growth
rate of output per worker:
k
.
γY = − + g.
L− k
′ ( ) = +f k rs state.∗ ∗ δ
Since the growth rate of K exceeds n + g
during the transition, k
.
−k must be greater than
0 during the corresponding interval of time.
Therefore, the growth rate of output per
worker also increases temporarily.
Figure 2 illustrates the hypothetical
response of the interest rate, the growth
rates of capital and output per worker, and
the natural log of output per worker under
the more palatable assumption that the
interest rate converges immediately upon
liberalization but the ratio of capital to
effective labor does not. Figures 3 through
5 (see pages 906–08), which display the
real-life responses of the cost of capital,
investment, and growth during eighteen
capital account liberalization episodes from
1986 to 1991, bear a striking resemblance
to the panels in figure 2. Section 5 discuss-
es the construction of figures 3 through 5
in detail, but even this preliminary glance
at the data raises an obvious issue. If the
simple time series evidence lines up with
the theory, then why does a large literature
find no real effects of liberalization? I have
already hinted at part of the answer, but
the full story requires a more thorough
account of the previous literature.
3. The Cross-Sectional Approach to
Measuring the Impact of Liberalization
Does capital account liberalization pro-
mote a more efficient allocation of resources
across countries? This section describes the
methodology, data, and results associated
with the traditional, cross-sectional approach
to this question.
Attempts to measure the impact of capital
account liberalization on economic perform-
ance require information on countries’ capi-
tal account policies. The International
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (AREAER) provides the most
readily available, standardized source of
such information. Available since 1967, the
AREAER provides a list of the rules and reg-
ulations governing resident and nonresident
891Henry: Capital Account Liberalization
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Figure 2. The Impact of Liberalization on the Cost of Capital, Investment, and Growth
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capital-account transactions in each country,
a table that summarizes the presence of
restrictions, and a qualitative judgment on
whether the country has an open or closed
capital account. For the editions of AREAER
published between 1967 and 1996, the sum-
mary table contains a single line (line E2)
entitled, “Restrictions on payments for capi-
tal transactions.”  The presence of a bullet
point in line E2 indicates that the country
has some form of restrictions on capital
account transactions. In effect, line E2 deliv-
ers a binary judgment that takes on the value
one if any capital controls are in place and
zero otherwise.
The typical study maps the qualitative
information from line E2 into a quantitative
measure of capital account openness by tal-
lying the number of years that each country
was judged to have an open capital account.
That tally is then divided by the total num-
ber of years in the period to produce a num-
ber called SHARE—the fraction of years
over a given period that the IMF judged the
country to be free from “restrictions on pay-
ments for capital account transactions.”  For
example, if a country had an open capital
account for three of the ten years from 1986
to 1995, then SHARE is equal to 0.3.
3.1 Empirical Methodology
Papers that use the variable SHARE assess
the real effects of capital account liberaliza-
tion by running some variant of the following
cross-country growth regression:
(6).........GROWTHi = a0 + a1 • SHAREi
+ CONTROLSi + εi,
where GROWTHi denotes the average
growth rate of real GDP per capita in coun-
try i over the time period in question—typi-
cally about twenty years—and  the variable
CONTROLSi serves as a compact stand-in
for the usual set of control variables used in
cross-country growth regressions in the tradi-
tion of Robert J. Barro (1991). With the vari-
able SHARE in hand, estimating equation (6)
is a relatively straightforward exercise
because data on the left-hand-side variable
are readily available from standard sources
such as the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics.
Because equation (6) does not contain
time subscripts, it makes no use of the varia-
tion in growth rates or openness over time
within a given country. In other words, it
identifies the impact of capital account poli-
cy exclusively through the cross-country
variation in average growth rates and frac-
tion of years open. In effect, the estimation
procedure tests for a permanent impact of
liberalization on growth, measuring whether
countries with open capital accounts have
higher long-run growth rates than countries
whose capital accounts are closed.
The problem with this test is that we have
already seen (in section 2) that the neoclassi-
cal model does not predict that countries
with open capital accounts will have higher
long-run growth rates than countries with
closed capital accounts. In the neoclassical
model, differences in long-run growth rates
across countries are driven exclusively by
differences in their growth rates of total fac-
tor productivity (TFP). Because it contains
no channel through which capital account
liberalization affects TFP growth, strictly
speaking, the model provides no theoretical
basis for estimating equation (6).2 In other
words, papers that estimate the effects of
capital account openness on growth do not
provide a test of any causal theory. What the
theory does predict is that capital-poor coun-
tries will experience a permanent fall in their
cost of capital and a temporary increase in
the growth rate of their capital stock and
GDP per capita when they liberalize.
Testing whether countries with more open
capital accounts invest more or grow faster
893Henry: Capital Account Liberalization
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than countries with closed capital accounts is
not logically equivalent to testing whether
countries that liberalize experience a tempo-
rary increase in investment and growth.
Moreover, the following example demon-
strates that there are nontrivial examples in
which the purely cross-sectional regression
framework leads to specious conclusions
about the data.
3.1.1 Numerical Example of the Pitfalls of
the Cross-Sectional Regression
Approach
Consider two countries (A and B) that are
in steady state and have the same level and
growth rate of total factor productivity.
Country A has a closed capital account while
country B has no capital account restrictions
whatsoever. Assume that both countries are
small and that the world interest rate r∗ is
lower than r, the domestic interest rate in
country A. Since country B is open and faces
the world interest rate, r∗, country B will
have a higher ratio of capital to effective
labor than country A. Because both coun-
tries are in steady state and have identical
growth rates of total factor productivity, they
will also have identical growth rates of GDP
per capita (although B has a higher level of
GDP per capita).
Now consider the path of these two
economies over the next twenty years under
the following scenario: country A keeps all of
its restrictions on capital in place for the first
ten years but removes all restrictions on cap-
ital inflows and outflows for the second ten
years while country B, on the other hand,
makes no change in its capital account poli-
cy and remains completely open for the
entire twenty-year period.
The transition dynamics in this example
follow immediately from the discussion in
section 2. Country B continues to grow at its
steady-state rate because nothing there has
changed. To understand what happens to
country A when it liberalizes, recognize that
as soon as it does so it will face the same cost
of capital as country B. Therefore, when
country A reaches its new steady state, it will
have the same ratio of capital to effective
labor as country B. For country A to reach its
new, higher, steady-state ratio of capital to
effective labor, the growth rate of its capital
stock must exceed its growth rate of effective
labor throughout the transition to its new
equilibrium. Since A began in a steady state
where capital and effective labor were grow-
ing at the same rate, the growth rate of A’s
capital stock must increase temporarily.
The temporary increase in the growth rate
of A’s capital stock will also generate a tempo-
rary increase in the growth rate of its GDP per
capita. Since GDP per capita in A and B were
growing at the same rate before the shock, it
follows that A grows faster than B throughout
A’s transition to its new steady state. Because
A grows faster than B throughout the transi-
tion, it also follows that A will have a higher
average growth rate for the twenty-year peri-
od under consideration than country B.
What would we conclude about the
impact of capital account openness on
growth if, using data from multiple countries
like A and B, we ran a regression of
GROWTH on SHARE? The answer is that
we would conclude that capital account
openness has a negative impact on growth.
To see why, remember that A’s capital
account was open for ten years and closed
for ten. This means that SHARE for country
A is 0.5, a smaller number than the value of
SHARE for country B, which is equal to 1.
Since A has faster growth and a lower value
of SHARE over the period than country B, it
follows that regressing GROWTH on
SHARE would produce a negative coeffi-
cient on SHARE, with the attendant (and
specious) conclusion that liberalization
exerts a negative impact on growth. Yet in
this example it is clear that country A’s deci-
sion to liberalize capital inflows does lead to
a temporary increase in growth. The strictly
cross-sectional regression framework is sim-
ply powerless to detect the effect.
Although the cross-sectional approach does
not test the predictions of the neoclassical
894 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLV (December 2007)
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growth model, a large number of papers use
equation (6), or a close cousin, as their
benchmark of analysis. Of the fourteen stud-
ies of liberalization and growth summarized
in table 3 of the survey by Prasad et al.
(2003), twelve perform cross-sectional
regressions. The corresponding numbers
from other surveys are nine of ten in table 6
of Edison et al. (2004); eleven of twelve in
table 1 of César Calderón, Norman Loayza,
and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (2004); and
twenty-two of twenty-five in M. Ayhan Kose
et al. (2006). Given the prevalence of the
cross-sectional regression approach in the
literature on the macroeconomic effects of
capital account liberalization, it is important
to spell out what these papers do and the
results they find.
3.2 Evidence
Attempts to quantify the real effects of
capital account liberalization using SHARE
have not been kind to the Allocative
Efficiency view. Most of the published
papers in the cross-sectional genre find no
effect of liberalization on investment or
growth. In the most prominent example of
such papers, Rodrik (1998) examines the
relation between liberalization and growth
in a sample of 100 developed and developing
countries from 1975 to 1989. Specifically,
Rodrik estimates regressions with average
growth rates of GDP per capita on the left-
hand side and SHARE on the right-hand
side. His regressions show no statistically sig-
nificant correlation between growth and
SHARE. Since the theoretical channel from
liberalization to growth operates through
capital accumulation, Rodrik also regresses
the average ratio of investment-to-GDP on
SHARE and again finds no statistically sig-
nificant correlation. He concludes that there
is no evidence to suggest that countries with
fewer restrictions on capital movements
grow faster, or invest more, than countries
with greater restrictions.
One problem with the variable SHARE is
that it is constructed from a binary measure of
capital controls that treats all countries as
either completely closed or completely open.
As such, it does not allow for varying degrees
of intensity across countries that are classified
as open. In an attempt to address this prob-
lem, Dennis Quinn (1997) uses the informa-
tion in the AREAER to create a measure of
the intensity of capital account openness.
Quinn’s measure splits capital account trans-
actions into two categories: capital account
receipts and capital account payments. For
each of the two categories, he assigns a coun-
try a score between 0 and 2 based on a read-
ing of the qualitative description of the
AREAER reports. A score of 0 indicates the
most restrictive of regimes, where payments
for capital transactions are completely forbid-
den, while a score of 2 indicates that capital
transactions are not subject to any taxes or
restrictions. Intermediate scores—broken
into increments of 0.5—indicate intermediate
levels of restrictiveness. Quinn then adds the
scores for the two categories to create a vari-
able called CAPITAL, which ranges from 0 to
4. Quinn’s indicators are available annually
from 1950 to 1997 for twenty-one
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries. For the
forty-three non-OECD countries in his sam-
ple, they are available for four different years:
1958, 1973, 1982, and 1988. Quinn runs
cross-sectional regressions of average annual
growth rates on changes in CAPITAL and
finds a positive and significant correlation.
Quinn’s data provide a novel attempt at
quantifying the intensity of capital account
openness, but there are two reasons why
they may be of limited use for understand-
ing the impact of capital account liberaliza-
tion on developing countries. First, Quinn’s
data for non-OECD countries end in 1988
and, therefore, do not cover the most rapid
period of capital account liberalization in
the developing world (the late 1980s and
early 1990s). Given the time span of his
data, Quinn’s results may reflect the impact
of the move from closed to open capital
markets among the developed nations. For
895Henry: Capital Account Liberalization
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example, in 1973 eleven OECD countries
and twenty-six developing countries scored
2 or lower on Quinn’s index. In 1988, the
number of OECD countries with a score of
2 or lower fell to one. In contrast, the num-
ber of developing countries with a score of 2
or lower rose to thirty-two. Second, Quinn,
like Rodrik, also uses a strictly cross-section-
al regression framework, so his results imply
that easing restrictions on capital account
transactions have permanent effects on
growth. Since theory predicts only a tempo-
rary effect, it is not clear how to interpret
this result (more on this in section 4.1).
Whatever the correct interpretation of
Quinn’s results may be, in finding a positive
effect of liberalization on growth, his study
is an outlier among the most heavily cited
papers that assess the macroeconomic
impact of capital account liberalization
using cross-sectional regressions. For
instance, using data on a sample of devel-
oped and developing countries from 1976
to 1995, Ross Levine and Sara Zervos
(1998b) examine whether capital account
liberalization has an effect on investment.
Like Rodrik and Quinn, they also test for
permanent effects, but use a different
measure of liberalization. Specifically,
Levine and Zervos ask whether countries
experience a permanent increase in the
growth rate of their capital stocks when
their stock markets become more integrat-
ed with the rest of the world. They argue
that emerging stock markets became more
integrated in the 1980s and use 1985 as a
common break point across all countries.
Next, they examine whether the growth
rate of the capital stock of the countries in
their sample increased after 1985. They
find no evidence that this is the case and
conclude that capital account liberalization
has no effect on investment.
Among the entire class of papers that test
whether countries with more open capital
accounts have permanently higher growth
rates than those that do not, the bulk of evi-
dence supports the findings of Rodrik (1998)
and Levine and Zervos (1998b) over Quinn
(1997).3 For example, of the ten studies of
liberalization surveyed in Edison et al.
(2002), only three find an unambiguously
positive effect of liberalization on growth
(see their table 6). Prasad et al. (2003)
extend the Edison et al. survey to fourteen
studies, but still find only three papers that
uncover a significant positive relationship
between international financial integration
and economic growth.
A number of papers debate whether the
absence of significant evidence is a conse-
quence of trying to find an unconditional
correlation between openness and long-run
growth when the relationship between the
two variables is more complicated. Because
countries with strong institutions stand to
gain more from capital account liberaliza-
tion, the relationship between growth and
capital account policy may be a conditional
one that depends on the strength of a coun-
try’s institutions.4 Michael W. Klein and
Giovanni P. Olivei (2007) explore this
hypothesis using data on sixty-seven coun-
tries from 1976 to 1995. They find a signifi-
cant correlation between SHARE and
growth, but the developed countries in the
sample drive the results. There is no signifi-
cant correlation between growth and
SHARE for the non-OECD countries, lead-
ing the authors to conclude that capital
account liberalization only promotes finan-
cial development when done in an environ-
ment that is supportive in terms of its overall
institutional development.
Sebastian Edwards (2001) uses Quinn’s
CAPITAL measure and the variable
SHARE to conduct formal tests for a condi-
tional relationship between capital controls
and long-run growth rates in a sample of
twenty industrial and emerging economies
during the 1980s. To test whether the
896 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLV (December 2007)
3 See also Alberto Alesina, Vittorio Grilli, and Gian
Maria Milesi-Ferretti (1994), Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti
(1995), Aart Kraay (1998), and Edison et al. (2002).
4 See Kose et al. (2006) for an extensive review of the
literature on the conditional effects of liberalization.
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impact of capital account policy varies
according to a country’s level of develop-
ment, Edwards interacts each country’s
capital account openness measure with its
level of GDP per capita in 1980. He finds
evidence that an open capital account posi-
tively affects growth after a country
achieves a certain degree of economic
development.
Carlos Arteta, Eichengreen, and Charles
Wyplosz (2001) take exception with
Edwards’s results on the grounds that he (1)
uses Quinn’s measure in 1973 and 1988 only;
(2) weights observations by GDP per capita
in 1985, thereby giving richer countries a
higher weight; and (3) uses instruments that
may not be appropriate. Using data on sixty-
one countries from 1973 to 1992, Arteta,
Eichengreen, and Wyplosz perform cross-
sectional regressions using Ordinary Least
Squares and Instrumental Variables. They
find a fragile association between growth and
capital account liberalization and conclude
that there is little evidence to suggest that
capital account liberalization has a larger
impact in high- and middle-income countries
than in poor developing ones.
Like Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz
(2001), Kraay (1998) also finds no evidence of
a conditional relationship between capital
account liberalization and growth.5 In fact,
while future work may prove otherwise, it
seems fair to say that the absence of signifi-
cant results in the cross-sectional literature is
not a consequence of failing to condition their
tests on the level of institutional develop-
ment.6 Rather, the next section demonstrates
that the ostensible lack of an effect of liberal-
ization on real variables stems from a number
of more basic issues common to papers in the
cross-sectional literature—those that test for
the conditional and unconditional impact of
liberalization on growth alike.
4. The Reasons Why Cross-Sectional
Studies Find No Impact of Liberalization
on Growth
There are at least three reasons why stud-
ies that use purely cross-sectional regres-
sions find no impact of liberalization on
growth (although not all three reasons apply
to all studies). First, as mentioned earlier,
cross-sectional studies test for a permanent
effect of liberalization on growth when the-
ory says that the impact should be tempo-
rary. Second, many of the papers in this
literature include both developed and
developing countries in the sample when
theory argues for a separate examination of
the two types of countries.7 Third, the vari-
able SHARE contains important sources of
measurement error that hinder empirical
attempts to capture the impact of liberaliza-
tion on the real economy. I now discuss the
empirical consequences of each of these
three points.
4.1 What Does “Temporary” Mean in the
Context of the Neoclassical Model?
The extent to which it really matters
whether you test for a permanent versus
temporary growth effect of liberalization
depends on exactly what “temporary” means
in the context of the neoclassical model.
Testing for a permanent effect of liberaliza-
tion probably does little harm to the data if
the growth rate of output remains substan-
tially above its steady-state value for rough-
ly the same length of time as the interval
over which cross-sectional studies compute
the growth rates used in their regressions
(thirty years or so). If the period of elevated
economic growth is significantly shorter,
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5 Kraay’s paper also conducts within-country analyses
similar in spirit to the policy-experiment approach dis-
cussed in section 5. He finds no impact of liberalization,
but the dates in his analysis come from a different means
of identifying liberalization episodes.
6 This is not to deny the importance of institutional
considerations.
7 Some of the papers in this literature do acknowledge
differences between countries (see the discussion in sec-
tion 3.3). But papers that do acknowledge the importance
of country heterogeneity also use the SHARE variable to
test for permanent effects of liberalization.
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however, then the distinction between per-
manent and temporary matters a great deal.
The critical question, then, is the follow-
ing: For how many years following a liber-
alization is it reasonable to expect
capital-deepening-induced growth that is
large enough to detect with a cross-section-
al growth regression? There are two cases
to consider. The first case—instantaneous
convergence—was dismissed in section 2 as
an artifact of the neoclassical model. We
now consider the second case—when the
speed of transition is slower, in accordance
with reality.
There are a variety of formal ways to slow
down the speed of transition. In the discus-
sion which follows, I do so by treating the
transition from ks.state to k∗s.state as if it came
about from a permanent increase in a closed
country’s savings rate. The savings-rate
assumption offers several advantages in
determining how long the growth effect of
liberalization remains detectable.
First, an increase in the savings rate has
the same qualitative implications as a liberal-
ization: for a given r and r∗, there exists a
permanent increase in the savings rate such
that the country’s new steady state ratio of
capital to effective labor following the
increase would be exactly the same as under
a liberalization. Second, the savings-rate
assumption facilitates a more concise exposi-
tion than introducing adjustment costs (or
some other theoretical friction) to slow
down the installation of capital. Third, and
most importantly, the speed of convergence
under the savings-rate assumption is actual-
ly slower than it would be in the canonical
model of a small open economy with adjust-
ment costs (see Barro and Xavier Sala-i-
Martin 1995, chapter 2). A slower speed of
convergence implies a longer period of time
during which the economy’s output growth
remains elevated above its steady-state
value. This means that relative to other ana-
lytical methods of slowing down the transi-
tion dynamics, the savings-rate assumption
employed in the next several paragraphs
actually understates the importance of testing
for a temporary effect and therefore over-
states the statistical power of cross-sectional
regressions.
By how much does the country’s growth
rate in each year following the liberalization
exceed the growth rate that would have
occurred had the liberalization never taken
place? To answer this question, recall that
the growth rate of output per worker at any
point in time is:
k
.
(t)    
.
A(t)γY(t) =  ⎯− + ⎯⎯ .
L− k(t)    A(t)
Before liberalization, the economy is in
steady state with k
.(t)
⎯k(t)− = 0 and 
.A(t)
⎯A(t)− = g. Be-
cause liberalization has no impact on total
factor productivity in the model, it follows
that the deviation of the growth rate of out-
put per worker from its steady-state value
(g) in the aftermath of liberalization
equals k
.(t)
⎯k(t)−. To calculate the size of the out-
put growth deviation at any point in time, we
therefore need to know the entire time path
of k(t) during the economy’s transition to its
new steady state. Since we are treating con-
vergence from ks.state to k∗s.state as though it
comes from an increase in the savings rate,
standard arguments show that:
(7)      ,
where λ = (1 − )(n + g + δ).
Using equation (7) to compute the time
path of k(t) requires values of three key
parameters: ks.state—the steady-state ratio of
capital to effective labor before liberaliza-
tion, k∗s.state—the postliberalization steady-
state ratio of capital to effective labor, and
λ —the speed of convergence.
Pinning down the parameters ks.state and
k∗s.state requires assumptions about the dif-
ference between the autarky interest rate in
the developing country and the interest
rate in the rest of the world. I begin by
assuming that the autarky interest rate in
the developing country is twice as high as
the world interest rate, with r = 0.16 and
k t k k k es state s state s state
t( ) ( )= + − −. . .
∗ ∗ λ
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r∗ = 0.08. At these rates, ks.state = 2.15 and
k∗s.state = 4.63.8
The simplest way to pin down λ is to plug
reasonable values for the capital share (),
population growth (n), total factor produc-
tivity growth (g), and the depreciation rate
(δ) into the formula λ = (1 − )(n + g + δ).
The combination of a capital share of one-
third, population growth and TFP growth
between 1 and 2 percent, and depreciation
of 4 percent, places λ at about 4 percent per
year. Alternatively, one can obtain the speed
of convergence from cross-country growth
regressions. Early estimates implied speeds
of convergence of about 2 percent per year
(N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, and
David N. Weil 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin
1992). Subsequent work argues that the 2
percent estimates are inaccurate for a variety
of methodological reasons (Francesco
Caselli, Gerardo Esquivel, and Fernando
Lefort 1996). Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort
find that the speed of convergence is about
10 percent per year when estimated appro-
priately. In what follows, I perform calcula-
tions with a speed of convergence in the
mid-range of those used in the literature
(λ = 0.04). The basic conclusion—that there
is no statistically detectable impact of liber-
alization on growth over long horizons—
remains intact for speeds of convergence at
the high (λ = 0.1) and low (λ = 0.02) ends of
the spectrum.
With λ = 0.04, ks.state = 2.15, and k∗s.state
= 4.63, equation (7) implies that the average
growth rate of  k(t) in the first five years fol-
lowing liberalization is large: 3.8 percent
per year. Multiplying 3.8 by the elasticity of
output with respect to capital (1/3), gives
the average deviation of the growth rate of
output per worker from its long-run steady-
state value during the first five years postlib-
eralization: 1.27 percentage points per year.
After year 5, the impact of liberalization
on growth drops off considerably. From
years six through thirty, the average annual
growth rate of k(t) is 0.0154 or 1.5 percent
per year. This translates into an average
annual growth rate of output per worker
that is 0.0051, or 0.51 percentage points
above its steady-state value. I focus on the
growth impact in years six and beyond
because this period constitutes the differ-
ence between the policy experiment
approach to measuring the impact of liber-
alization (see figures 3 through 5) and the
cross-sectional regression approach. Given
that difference, the key question is the fol-
lowing: Can a cross-sectional regression dis-
tinguish a liberalization-induced growth
effect of 0.51 percentage points per year
from the usual noise in the data? Comparing
the magnitude of the hypothetical growth
effect (0.0051) to that of the standard errors
we typically see in regressions of growth on
SHARE provides a rough and ready answer
to the question. For instance, Rodrik (1998)
reports standard errors of 0.006 on the vari-
able SHARE. Dividing 0.0051 by 0.006
gives a t-statistic of 0.85—less than half the
magnitude required for statistical signifi-
cance. In contrast, the t-statistic on the
average effect over the first five years is 2.11
(.0127 divided by 0.006).
Changing the speed of convergence has
no material impact on the calculations.
When λ = 0.02, the average annual growth
effect of liberalization between years six and
thirty is 0.0041, with a corresponding t-sta-
tistic of 0.69. For λ = 0.1, the average annu-
al growth effect over the same horizon is
0.0045, with a t-statistic of 0.75. Similarly,
increasing the autarky rate interest rate in
the developing country to three times the
level in the rest of the world also does not
alter the results. Now, it is far from clear that
the rate of return to capital in developing
countries is even twice as high as in the
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.
Plugging in r = 0.16, δ = 0.04, and  = 1/3 gives
ks.state = 2.15. The analogous set of calculations gives the
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developed world (see section 6.1.2), so play-
ing with a threefold differential begins to
strain credulity. Nevertheless, I do so to
illustrate the likely futility of the cross-
sectional approach. Holding λ constant at
0.04 and increasing r to three times the level
of r∗, the average annual growth effect rises
to 0.008. With standard errors on the order
of 0.006, a growth effect of 0.008 is still too
small to attain statistical significance in a
cross-sectional regression.
One potential concern about the calcula-
tions in this subsection is that they focus on
growth in GDP per worker while cross-
sectional studies of liberalization focus on
growth in GDP per capita. If the growth rate
of the labor force exceeds the growth rate of
the population, then calculations of statisti-
cal significance using growth in GDP per
worker will be smaller than calculations
based on growth in GDP per capita, thereby
understating the true statistical power of
cross-sectional regressions.
Data on the growth of the labor force and
population in developing countries speak to
the issue. Between 1960 and 1997, the pop-
ulation in low- and middle-income develop-
ing countries grew at an average annual rate
of 2.2 percent per year while the labor force
grew at 2.1 percent per year (World Bank
1999). Since the growth rate of the popula-
tion actually exceeded the growth rate of the
labor force, if anything, calculations using
output per worker actually overstate the
impact of liberalization on the growth rate of
GDP per capita.
In other words, the calculations in this
subsection underscore the empirical rele-
vance of the critique that cross-sectional
regressions are unlikely to capture the true
impact of capital account liberalization
because they test for permanent instead of
temporary effects. Although the impact of
liberalization on growth remains positive for
a long time, the statistically significant por-
tion of that impact occurs in the immediate-
to-near aftermath of liberalization. Trying to
detect this near-term change by running
cross-sectional regressions on average
growth rates over long time horizons is not
an effective empirical strategy.
4.2 Country Heterogeneity
The second reason why cross-sectional
studies may fail to find significant effects of
liberalization is that they lump both devel-
oped and developing countries together in
their samples. Including both sets of coun-
tries increases sample size, but doing so
without employing an empirical methodolo-
gy that explicitly recognizes the fundamen-
tal theoretical difference between
developed and developing countries under-
mines a study’s ability to interpret the data.
The neoclassical model predicts that capital
account liberalization will have a different
impact on a developing country than on a
developed one. Developing countries are
capital poor and should experience net cap-
ital inflows, a permanent fall in their cost of
capital, and a temporary increase in growth
when they remove all restrictions on capital
flows. In contrast, capital-rich, developed
countries should experience exactly the
opposite effects.9 For instance, with both
developing and developed countries includ-
ed in their samples, the Rodrik (1998) and
Levine and Zervos (1998b) results may sug-
gest that capital account liberalization has
no effect on investment and growth, but the
results may also reflect the opposing effects
of liberalization in the developing- and
developed-country subsamples.
Developing and developed countries also
implemented the process of capital account
liberalization at different times. Developed
countries liberalized in the late 1970s and
early 1980s (Helmut Reisen and Bernhard
Fischer 1993). Most developing countries
did not liberalize until the late 1980s and
early 1990s (Donald J. Mathieson and
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exports capital, its GNP will rise as it receives the income
that accrues to that capital. I discuss the Lucas (1990)
paradox in section 5.
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Liliana Rojas-Suárez 1993). The differences
in liberalization dates highlight an addition-
al limitation of the Rodrik paper. Since
developing-country liberalizations com-
menced in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
empirical attempts to determine whether
liberalization boosted investment and
growth should use data that extend into the
1990s. Because Rodrik’s data end in 1989,
they exclude developing-country economic
performance in precisely the period when
we would expect to see the effects of liber-
alization. Therefore, it is not clear that
Rodrik’s data tell us anything about the
impact of capital account liberalization on
growth in developing countries.10
4.3 Measurement Error Problems with
Liberalization Indicators
Cross-sectional studies conclude that capi-
tal account liberalization has no real effects
because they do not find any correlation
between economic growth and broad meas-
ures of capital account openness such as
SHARE. As discussed in section 3.1, studies
construct the variable SHARE using the judg-
ment on capital account openness contained
in line E2 of the IMF’s AREAER. In turn, the
judgment in the AREAER is based on the
restrictions applied to an exhaustive list of all
possible capital account transactions.11 When
the IMF changes its assessment of a country’s
capital account openness, the AREAER pro-
vides no information on the specific aspect of
the capital account the country liberalized.
Because the underlying data provide no indi-
cation of what has been liberalized, neither
can any index that is based on such data.
Without any indication of what drives the
variation in SHARE, it is also unclear how to
map that variation to a well-articulated model
for the purpose of empirical estimation.
For example, AREAER does not tell
whether the IMF made a change in the
judgment about the openness of a country’s
capital account because of an easing of
restrictions on capital inflows or capital out-
flows. This distinction matters. Theory pre-
dicts that when a capital-poor country
liberalizes capital inflows it will experience a
permanent fall in its cost of capital and a
temporary increase in the growth rate of its
capital stock and GDP per capita. In princi-
ple, if that same developing country were to
liberalize capital outflows, nothing would
happen to its cost of capital, investment, or
GDP.
If the goal is to understand whether capi-
tal account liberalization has real effects,
then theory tells us that the right question to
ask is the following: Do we see a fall in the
cost of capital and a temporary increase in
investment and growth after developing
countries liberalize restrictions on capital
inflows? The most direct and transparent
way of answering this question is to examine
whether the behavior of the cost of capital,
investment, and growth in the immediate
aftermath of liberalization differs from its
behavior in the immediately preceding peri-
od. We now discuss a class of papers which
attempt to do just that.
5. The Policy-Experiment Approach to
Capital Account Liberalization
Examining the behavior of real variables
before and after the removal of restrictions
on capital inflows requires information
about the date on which the restrictions
were lifted. The policy-experiment approach
grapples with the complexity of identifying
liberalization dates by narrowing the scope
of the problem. Instead of trying to deter-
mine the date on which the entire capi-
tal account was judged to be open, as in 
the cross-sectional approach, the policy-
experiment literature tries to identify the
first point in time that a country liberalizes a
specific aspect of its capital account policy.
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10 Figure 5A of Kose et al. (2006) looks at the data from
1985 to 2004. Like Rodrik, they find no significant rela-
tionship between growth and capital account openness.
The discussion in section 4.1 of this paper explains why.
11 For an extensive enumeration of these transactions,
see the appendix of Kose et al. (2006).
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One example of liberalizing a specific
aspect of the capital account is a decision by
a country’s government to permit foreigners
to purchase shares of companies listed on the
domestic stock market. Liberalizing restric-
tions on the ownership of domestic shares
enables foreign capital to flow into a part of
the country’s economy from which it was pre-
viously prohibited. Just such a policy change
occurred repeatedly in the late 1980s and
early 1990s as a number of developing coun-
tries opened their stock markets to foreign
investors for the first time (Stijn Claessens
and Moon-Whoan Rhee 1994). These stock
market liberalizations constitute discrete
removals of barriers to capital inflows that
bear close resemblance to the model in sec-
tion 2. As the closest empirical analogue to
the textbook example, stock market liberal-
izations provide real-world policy experi-
ments that allow researchers to evaluate the
empirical validity of the two competing views
of capital account liberalization outlined in
the introduction.
Since the stock market is forward looking,
the critical question is when does the market
first learn of a credible, impending liberal-
ization? In principle, obtaining this informa-
tion simply involves identifying the date on
which the government declares that foreign-
ers may purchase domestic shares. In prac-
tice, the liberalization process is not so
transparent. The literature uses official poli-
cy decree dates when they are available, but
in many cases there is no obvious govern-
ment declaration or policy decree to which
one can refer (see, for example, Levine and
Zervos 1994). When policy decree dates are
not available, papers in this area typically
pursue two approaches.
First, many countries initially permitted
foreign ownership through closed-end coun-
try funds. Since one presumably needs gov-
ernment permission to establish a fund, the
first country fund establishment date serves
as a proxy for the official implementation
date. The second way of indirectly capturing
official implementation dates is to monitor
the International Finance Corporation’s
Investibility Index (Claessens and Rhee
1994). The investibility index is the ratio of
the market capitalization of stocks that for-
eigners can legally hold to total market capi-
talization. As such, a large jump in the
investibility index provides indirect evidence
of an official liberalization. In the end, the
policy-experiment literature defines the date
of a country’s first stock market liberalization
as the first month with a verifiable occur-
rence of any of the following: liberalization
by policy decree, establishment of the first
country fund, or an increase in the investibil-
ity index beyond a certain threshold.12
An important limitation of the policy-
experiment approach is that relatively few
developing countries have a stock market,
publish reliable stock market data, and also
implemented a liberalization. Hence, the
number of countries that can feasibly be
included under the stock-market-liberaliza-
tion-based implementation of the policy-
experiment approach is much smaller than
in purely cross-sectional studies (an issue I
discuss further in section 6.1.3).
Table 1 presents a list of eighteen devel-
oping countries that liberalized their stock
markets between 1986 and 1993. The third
column of the table indicates that the modal
indicator of liberalization for this sample is
the establishment of a closed-end country
fund. Relative to the broader indicators
employed elsewhere in the literature, the
establishment of a country fund, in particu-
lar, and stock market liberalizations in gen-
eral may seem like a narrow way to define
capital account liberalization.
But again, it is precisely the narrowness of
stock market liberalizations that make them
more useful than broad indicators of capital
account liberalization for testing the implica-
tions of the theory. For all of the reasons
explained in section 4.3, broad indicators,
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determining the dates of stock market liberalizations.
dec07_Article1  11/28/07  12:01 PM  Page 902
such as the IMF’s, introduce significant
measurement error. Since measurement
error reduces the statistical power of any
regression, it is important to focus on policy
experiments where the true variation in the
data is large relative to the noise. Stock mar-
ket liberalizations provide just such experi-
ments, because they constitute a radical shift
in the degree of capital account openness
(Jeffrey A. Frankel 1994).
In addition to identifying episodes of large
changes in capital account openness, focus-
ing narrowly on stock market liberalization
offers another advantage. In contrast with
the unspecified easing of restrictions indi-
cated by movements in the variable
SHARE, there is no theoretical ambiguity
about the expected impact of lifting restric-
tions on the flow of capital into the stock
market of a developing country. Since stocks
are risky, however, using stock market liber-
alizations to examine the impact of capital
account liberalization on economic per-
formance raises issues of uncertainty not
addressed by the deterministic framework
outlined in section 2.
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TABLE 1
DATES OF STOCK MARKET LIBERALIZATIONS AND MAJOR ECONOMIC REFORMS
Country Year of Means of Stabilization Trade Privatization Brady Plan
Liberalization Liberalization Program Liberalization Debt Relief
Argentina November 1989 Policy Decree November 1989 April 1991 February 1988 April 1992
Brazil March 1988 Country Fund January 1989 April 1990 July 1990 August 1992
Chile May 1987 Country Fund August 1985 1976 1988 NA
Colombia December 1991 Policy Decree NA 1986 1991 NA
India June 1986 Country Fund November 1981 1994 1991 NA
Indonesia September 1989 Policy Decree May 1973 1970 1991 NA
Jordan December 1995 Policy Decree May 1994 1965 January 1995 June 1993
Malaysia May 1987 Country Fund NA 1963 1988 NA
Mexico May 1989 Policy Decree May 1989 July 1986 November 1988 September 1989
Nigeria August 1995 Policy Decree January 1991 NA July 1988 March 1991
Pakistan February 1991 Policy Decree September 1993 2001 1990 NA
Philippines May 1986 Country Fund October 1986 November 1988 June 1988 August 1989
South June 1987 Country Fund July 1985 1968 NA NA
Korea
Taiwan May 1986 Country Fund NA 1963 NA NA
Thailand September 1987 Country Fund June 1985 Always Open 1988 NA
Turkey August 1989 Policy Decree July 1994 1989 1988 NA
Venezuela January 1990 Policy Decree June 1989 May 1989∗ April 1991 June 1990
Zimbabwe June1993 Policy Decree September 1992 NA 1994 NA
Notes: The capital account liberalization dates identified in this table are the dates on which the eighteen countries
in Column 1 eased restrictions prohibiting foreign ownership of domestic stocks. The liberalization dates in Column
2 are an amalgamation of those in Henry (2000a), Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Kim and Singal (2000), and Levine
and Zervos (1994). Column 3 indicates the form of the liberalization, policy decree or country fund opening;
Section 5 of the paper contains a detailed description of both forms. Columns 4 through 7 list the dates of major
economic reforms that occurred around the same time as the capital account liberalizations. The stabilization pro-
gram dates in column 4 come from Henry (2002) and various issues of the IMF Annual Reports. Column 5 lists
trade liberalization dates from Sachs and Warner (1995). The privatization dates in column 6 come from the
Privatization Data Base maintained by the World Bank. Finally, column 7 lists the month and year that each country
received debt relief under the Brady Plan. The debt relief dates come from Cline (1995), Lexis Nexis, and various
issues of the Economist Intelligence Unit. ∗Venezuela reversed its trade liberalization reforms in 1993.
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5.1 Extending the Theoretical Framework
to Incorporate Uncertainty
This subsection shows that the funda-
mental predictions of the deterministic
neoclassical model of capital account liber-
alization extend to the risky-asset setting of
the policy-experiment approach.13 In the
absence of uncertainty, it is optimal to
invest until the marginal product of capital
equals the interest rate. When the payoff
from investing in capital is risky, the inter-
est rate is no longer the relevant hurdle rate
for investment. Optimality in a risky world
requires that investment take place until
the expected marginal product of capital
equals the interest rate plus a risk premium
to compensate for the uncertain return to
capital.
For a country that has not yet opened its
stock market to the rest of the world, this
means that the first-order condition for
investment is f ′(k)e = r + θ + δ, where f ′(k)e
denotes the expected marginal product of
capital, r is the domestic interest rate, θ is
the aggregate equity premium, and δ is the
rate of depreciation of the capital stock. In
the context of the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM), θ is equal to the price of risk, γ,
times the variance of the market return, so
that the first-order condition for investment
under uncertainty is:
(8)          (r∼M) + δ,
where r∼M is the risky return to investing in
the market.
Starting from the equilibrium in equation
(8), the issue is whether liberalization
reduces the cost of capital as it does when
there is no uncertainty.14 The first compo-
nent of the cost of capital is the domestic
′ = +f k r Vare( ) γ
interest rate (r), which responds the same
way to liberalization as in the case of perfect
certainty—it falls to the world interest rate
(r∗). The second component of the cost of
capital is the aggregate equity premium.
Whereas the equity premium before liberal-
ization is equal to the price of risk times the
variance of the local market return, the equi-
ty premium after liberalization is equal to
the price of risk times the covariance of the
local market with the rest of the world (see
Stulz 1999b).
The change in both components of the
cost of capital means that following liberal-
ization the first-order condition for invest-
ment becomes:
(9)        (r∼M,r∼W) + δ.
Because the world interest rate (r∗) is less
than the domestic interest rate (r), compar-
ing the right-hand-side of equation (9) with
that of (8) indicates that liberalization will
reduce the cost of capital if the variance of
the domestic market return is greater than
its covariance with the world market.
Historical stock returns show that this condi-
tion holds for emerging stock markets (Stulz
1999b). Stock market liberalization there-
fore reduces the cost of capital, and the
attendant predictions about investment and
growth follow accordingly.
5.2 Evidence: The Cost of Capital,
Investment, and Growth
We do not observe the cost of capital
directly, but we do observe stock prices.
Because stock prices and the cost of capital
move inversely, we should observe a one-
time revaluation of the stock market if lib-
eralization reduces the cost of capital. In a
sample of twelve emerging economies that
liberalized between 1986 and 1991, the
average country experienced a revaluation
of 26 percent in real dollar terms (Henry
2000b). E. Han Kim and Vijay Singal (2000)
and Rodolfo Martell and Stulz (2003) also
document a sharp rise in stock prices in
′ = +f k r Cove( ) ∗ γ
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13 The discussion in this section borrows heavily from
Jeremy I. Bulow and Summers (1984) and René M. Stulz
(1999b).
14 For expositional convenience, I assume that liberal-
ization has no effect on the marginal product of capital.
Section 7.1 discusses what happens when this assumption
does not hold.
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conjunction with liberalizations.15 Consis-
tent with these revaluations, liberalizations
also coincide with an average fall in dividend
yields of 5 to 75 basis points (Bekaert and
Harvey 2000).16 While the magnitude of the
effect differs slightly depending on the sam-
ple of countries and the exact liberalization
dates applied, there is broad agreement
across all policy-experiment studies that lib-
eralization reduces the cost of capital.
Since liberalizations reduce the cost of
capital, some projects that were negative net
present value before liberalization become
worthwhile to undertake once the govern-
ment permits foreigners to hold domestic
shares. Consequently, the rate of capital
accumulation should rise until the marginal
product of capital is driven down to the
country’s new, lower cost of capital. If invest-
ment increases temporarily, so too should
the growth rate of GDP per capita.
The policy-experiment approach tests the
investment and growth predictions by esti-
mating panel regressions of the following
form:
(10)               
.
The variable GROWTH generically
denotes the growth rate of the variable of
interest: the capital stock in the case of the
investment regressions and GDP per capita.
The variable LIBERALIZE is a country-spe-
cific dummy variable that takes on the value
one in the year that country i liberalizes
(year [0]) and each of the subsequent five
years (year [+1] through year [+5]).
Equation (10) highlights two important
dimensions along which the policy-experi-
ment approach differs from the traditional
a LIBERALIZEit it+ +1 ∗ ε
GROWTH ait = 0
cross-sectional regression approach typified
by equation (6). First, equation (10) uses
every annual observation of each country’s
growth rate to exploit the variation in growth
rates within countries over time. In contrast,
equation (6) uses a single number on the
left-hand-side—the average growth rate
over the time period in question.
Second, the definition of the variable LIB-
ERALIZE ensures that equation (10) tests
for a temporary effect of liberalization on
growth instead of a permanent one as in
equation (6). If liberalization causes a tem-
porary increase in growth, then estimating
equation (10) should produce a positive and
significant estimate of the coefficient on the
variable LIBERALIZE. In other words, the
coefficient on LIBERALIZE measures the
average annual abnormal growth during the
five-year window subsequent to the imple-
mentation of a liberalization. It is natural to
ask why policy-experiment studies choose a
five-year liberalization window and how sen-
sitive the results are to that choice. It follows
from the discussion in section 4.1 that the
results should be sensitive to the choice of
window length and that a short window of
five years or less is theoretically appropriate.
The behavior of both investment and
GDP in the aftermath of liberalizations sup-
ports the predictions of the neoclassical
model. For the eighteen countries in table 1,
the raw growth rate of the capital stock rises
from an average of 5.4 percent per year in
the five years preceding liberalization to an
average of 6.5 percent in the five-year
postliberalization period (Henry 2003).
Similarly, in a sample of eleven emerging
economies, stock market liberalization leads
to a 22-percentage-point increase in the
growth rate of real private investment
(Henry 2000a). Of the eleven countries in
the sample, only two do not experience
abnormally high rates of investment in the
first year after liberalization, and only one in
the second year after liberalization. Bekaert,
Harvey, and Christian Lundblad (2005) find
that the growth rate of GDP per capita
905Henry: Capital Account Liberalization
15 A related literature shows that firms in emerging
markets experience stock price increases when they list
their shares on stock exchanges in developed countries
(see G. Andrew Karolyi 1998 and Stephen R. Foerster
and Karolyi 1999).
16 See also Vihang R. Errunza and Darius P. Miller
(2000).
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increases by a percentage point per annum.
An important question that I defer until 
section 6.3 is whether the growth and 
investment numbers are mutually consistent.
Figures 3 through 5 summarize the prin-
cipal findings of the policy-experiment liter-
ature by plotting the cost of capital,
investment, and growth in event time for
the eighteen countries listed in table 1.17
When developing countries liberalize capi-
tal flows into their stock markets, the cost of
capital falls and investment increases along
with the growth rate of GDP per capita. In
contrast to the cross-sectional studies
reviewed in section 3, the evidence from the
policy-experiment approach demonstrates
that the real-world impact of capital account
liberalization is quite consistent with the
Allocative Efficiency view.
5.3 Economic Reforms
The policy-experiment evidence is also
consistent with interpretations in which lib-
eralization plays no causal role. Figure 3,
which uses the dividend yield as a proxy for
the cost of capital, helps to demonstrate the
point. The theoretical justification for inter-
preting a fall in the dividend yield as a reduc-
tion in the cost of capital comes from Myron
J. Gordon (1962). In the Gordon model, the
906 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLV (December 2007)
17 The data used to construct figure 4, the average
growth rate of the real capital stock for the eighteen coun-
tries in listed in table 1, come from Barry P. Bosworth and
Susan M. Collins (2003).
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Cost of Capital Falls When Countries Liberalize the Capital Account
Notes: Figure 3 plots the average value of the aggregate dividend yield in event time for the eighteen
countries listed in table 1. The x axis denotes time in years relative to the liberalization year: “0” denotes
the year in which the liberalization took place, “−1” denotes the year prior to liberalization, “+1” denotes
the year after liberalization, and so on.
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dividend yield equals the cost of capital, ρ,
minus the (constant) expected future growth
rate of dividends: D /P = ρ − ge.18 If the
growth rate of dividends does not change
with liberalization, then a fall in the dividend
yield implies a fall in the cost of capital.
Because liberalizations are part of a general
process that involves substantial macroeco-
nomic reforms, however, there is a strong
possibility that large changes in expected
future growth rates do occur at the same
time that countries liberalize.
Columns 4 through 7 of table 1 demon-
strate that the timing of economic reforms—
inflation stabilization, trade liberalization,
and privatization—poses a significant chal-
lenge to the central policy-experiment find-
ings reviewed in section 5.2. Stabilizing
inflation drives up asset prices, investment,
and output (Michael Bruno and William
Easterly 1998; Guillermo A. Calvo and
Carlos A. Végh 1999; Easterly 1996; Fischer,
Ratna Sahay, and Végh 2002; Henry 2000a,
2002). When a country liberalizes trade,
domestic production shifts toward the coun-
try’s comparative advantage, thereby increas-
ing its output for a given stock of capital and
labor. Accordingly, trade liberalization also
generates a temporary increase in the growth
rate of GDP and a permanent increase in the
level (Anne O. Krueger 1997, 1998; Jeffrey
D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner 1995;
Frankel and Romer 1999; Romain Wacziarg
and Karen Horn Welch 2003). Privatization
raises the efficiency and value of formerly
state-owned enterprises (William L.
Megginson and Jeffry M. Netter 2001).
Finally, in return for adopting reforms, many
countries received debt relief under the
Brady Plan. Debt relief also has a positive
impact on stock prices, investment, and out-
put in certain emerging economies (Serkan
Arslanalp and Henry 2005, 2006a, 2006b).
907Henry: Capital Account Liberalization
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Investment Booms When Countries Liberalize the Capital Account
Notes: Figure 4 plots the average growth rate of the aggregate capital stock in event time for the eighteen
countries listed in table 1. The x axis denotes time in years relative to the liberalization year: “0” denotes
the year in which the liberalization took place, “−1” denotes the year prior to liberalization, “+1” denotes
the year after liberalization, and so on.
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18 Recall that ρ = r + γVar(r~M) before liberalization and
ρ = r∗ + γ COV(r~M,r~W) after liberalization.
dec07_Article1  11/28/07  12:02 PM  Page 907
Papers in the policy-experiment literature
approach adopt different methods of trying to
disentangle the impact of liberalization from
that of other economic reforms. Some papers
treat reforms and liberalization symmetrical-
ly, constructing dummy variables that take on
the value one in the year a reform program of
a particular type begins and each of the five
subsequent years.19 Using the variable
REFORMS as a compact stand-in for the full
complement of the reform dummies, the key
regression then simply becomes an extension
of equation (10):
(11) 
+ .
Other papers, instead of conducting a
before-and-after analysis of reforms, use
REFORMSit i+ ε t
GROWTH a a LIBERALIZEit it= +0 1 ∗
continuous proxies such as the level of infla-
tion and trade openness.20 Kose et al. (2006)
discuss the relative merits of both approach-
es on page 19 of their survey.
5.4 Policy Endogeneity
The impact of stock market liberalization
on stock prices, dividend yields, investment,
and growth remains statistically and eco-
nomically significant after controlling for
reforms (Bekaert and Harvey 2000; Bekaert,
Harvey, and Lundblad 2005; Henry 2000a,
2000b). But an even more difficult interpre-
tation problem remains. Do liberalizations
drive up stock prices, investment, and eco-
nomic growth or does causation run the
other way round? Because liberalizing the
stock market during bad times may draw
908 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLV (December 2007)
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Growth Rate of GDP Per Capita Rises When Countries Liberalize the Capital Account
Notes: Figure 5 plots the average growth rate of GDP per capita in event time for the eighteen countries listed in table
1. The x axis denotes time in years relative to the liberalization year: “0” denotes the year in which the liberalization took
place, “−1” denotes the year prior to liberalization, “+1” denotes the year after liberalization, and so on.
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19 See, for example, Henry (2000b).
20 See, for instance, Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005).
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criticism for selling off the country at fire
sale prices, politicians may be may be more
inclined to open up when times are good
(Summers 1994). Liberalization may also be
the country-level equivalent of an initial
public offering (Martell and Stulz 2003). You
don’t have an IPO when things are going
poorly; you have one when valuations are
high because of exceptional growth opportu-
nities that require financing or because the
shares are simply overvalued. To the extent
that the economy’s current and expected
future performance influence policymakers’
decision to liberalize, the endogeneity prob-
lem is quite real.
In trying to think of a legitimate instru-
mental variable for this problem, one is
struck by the distinct lack of variables that
are correlated with the decision to liberal-
ize but uncorrelated with the stock market
or macroeconomic fundamentals. Changes
of political regime are a natural candidate
but, in addition to being correlated with lib-
eralizations, political changes also bring
new economic programs that influence
market expectations. IMF programs do not
make good instruments because, contrary
to popular wisdom, the IMF did not insist
on capital account liberalization as an ele-
ment of conditionality during its programs
at the time (see Fischer 1998). Because
none of the papers in the policy-experiment
literature are fully able to dispel with con-
cerns about endogeneity, the economically
large and statistically significant correla-
tions between liberalization and real vari-
ables uncovered by the policy-experiment
literature require a measured interpreta-
tion.
6. Problems with the Policy-Experiment
Approach
The strength of the policy-experiment
approach is that it provides a clear picture of
what happens to developing countries when
they liberalize capital inflows. The weakness
of the policy-experiment approach is that it
raises more questions than it answers (even
putting aside the issue of endogeneity raised
at the end of section 5). This section of the
paper addresses three of those questions.
6.1 Why Is the Financial Impact of
Liberalization So Small?
Liberalization drives up the value of the
stock market by roughly 30 percent in real
dollar terms. This is a large number relative
to most event studies of the stock market
conducted using U.S. data (see A. Craig
MacKinlay 1997). But it is small in compari-
son with theoretical predictions about the
impact of capital account liberalization.
Casual observation suggests that developing
countries have much lower ratios of capital to
labor than rich countries. If the neoclassical
model provides a reasonable description of
the world, then we should observe a much
larger financial impact when developing
countries permit capital flows into their stock
markets (Stulz 1999a, 1999c, 2005).
There are at least three possible explana-
tions for the relatively modest increase in
stock prices (decrease in the cost of capital)
associated with liberalizations. The first is that
the policy-experiment approach treats liberal-
ization as a one-shot event when it is really an
incremental process. The second explanation
is that the rate of return to capital in develop-
ing countries may not really be that much
higher than in the developed world (Robert
E. Lucas 1990; Mankiw 1995). The third is
that developing countries do have substantial-
ly higher rates of return but the presence of
capital market imperfections causes much of
the return differential to persist, even in the
face of free capital flows. The next three sub-
sections elaborate on each of these points in
turn.
6.1.1 Treating Liberalization as a Binary
Process May Understate Its True
Impact
The policy-experiment literature esti-
mates the change in the cost of capital that
occurs the first time a country opens its stock
909Henry: Capital Account Liberalization
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market to foreign investors. This approach
presents three problems that could poten-
tially explain the relatively small valuation
effects. First, stock price effects at the date
of liberalization may be small if the liberal-
izations were anticipated. Stock prices do
increase in anticipation of liberalization but
the preliberalization run-up in valuations is
not large enough to account for the puzzle
(Henry 2000b).
Second, investors may perceive that the
liberalization will be reversed. If foreign
investors believe that the government will
reverse the policy at some point in the
future, then they will value domestic shares
less highly than if the policy change was fully
credible. Although Malaysia in 1997 is the
only case of an actual reversal (see section
6.2), liberalizations may suffer from a sort of
peso problem that reduces the magnitude of
the revaluation.21
The third problem is that countries sel-
dom move from having a completely closed
stock market to one that is fully open. Most
countries undergo several stock market lib-
eralizations subsequent to the first. South
Korea provides a good example. South
Korea began allowing foreigners very limit-
ed access to its stock market through closed-
end country funds as early as 1982, but did
not start lifting its statutory ceiling on for-
eign investment until 1992.22 Even then,
South Korea did not finish lifting its regula-
tory ceiling until 1998 (Inseok Shin and
Changyun Park forthcoming).
If a country takes several episodes to
open its stock market completely, then look-
ing exclusively at the stock market response
to its initial opening may understate the
total financial impact of the liberalization
process (Stulz 1999b). One way of address-
ing the issue is to estimate the market
response to every opening, sum up all of the
responses, and use the resulting number as
a proxy for the total liberalization effect. It
turns out that stock market responses to lib-
eralizations subsequent to the first are fairly
small, so the incremental-opening hypothe-
sis cannot account for the small financial
impact of liberalization.
Another alternative is to estimate the total
financial impact using continuous measures
of liberalization such as the IFC’s investible
index (Edison and Francis E. Warnock
2003). Again, the investible index indicates
the fraction of the domestic stock market
capitalization that foreign investors may
legally own. In contrast to the policy-experi-
ment approach, which estimates the one-
time response of the stock market at the
time of a large, discrete change in the
investible index, the continuous approach
regresses returns or dividend yields on the
level of the investibility index over the entire
sample. The continuous approach also
reveals a small change in the cost of capital.
The estimated cumulative fall in the divi-
dend yield is about 140 basis points (Frank
De Jong and Frans A. De Roon 2005). All in
all, the evidence suggests that the dichotomy
between the binary measure of liberalization
used by policy-experiment papers and the
more gradual nature of the process cannot
explain the relatively small financial impact
of liberalizations.
6.1.2 Poor Institutions in Developing
Countries May Reduce the Return to
Capital
Large differences in capital-to-labor
ratios across countries imply large differ-
ences in rates of return to capital only if all
countries have the same level of total factor
productivity. In standard production theory,
the level of total factor productivity is cap-
tured by the parameter A, which is usually
taken to be an index of technology or ideas.
But it is important to remember that, for a
910 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLV (December 2007)
21 See Rawi Abdelal and Laura Alfaro (2002, 2003) for
a detailed discussion of the imposition of capital controls
in Malaysia. The reversal of open capital markets by Thai
authorities in December 2006 lasted less than 24 hours,
but the sharp impact it had on valuations reinforces the
point.
22 See Keith Park and Antoine W. Van Agtmael (1993),
Margaret M. Price (1994), and Ian M. Wilson (1992).
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given stock of technology, total factor pro-
ductivity measures the general efficiency
with which an economy transforms capital
and labor into output (Solow 2001). Holding
technology constant, many factors may
influence the general level of efficiency.
For instance, weak institutions and inap-
propriate government regulation can distort
economic decision making, reduce total fac-
tor productivity, and lead to lower rates of
return than would otherwise prevail (Arnold
C. Harberger 1998). The rate of return to
capital in emerging economies may not be
much higher than in rich countries if emerg-
ing-market governments fail to create “an
environment that supports productive activ-
ities and encourages capital accumulation,
skill acquisition, invention and technology
transfer” (Robert E. Hall and Charles I.
Jones 1999).
To illustrate the point, table 2 demonstrates
the gap between the G-7 countries and the
eighteen emerging economies that liberalized
their stock markets using some frequently
employed measures of the quality of econom-
ic institutions. Column 2 shows that, accord-
ing to the Hall and Jones (1999) measure of
social infrastructure, the median G-7 country
ranks fourteenth of 130 countries, while the
median emerging economy ranks sixty-
fourth. Columns 3 through 5, which present
analogous measures using the Heritage
House’s Index of Economic Freedom, the
World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index,
and the World Economic Forum’s Global
Competitiveness Index, display a similar
pattern.
In other words, the relatively small finan-
cial effects of liberalization may simply indi-
cate that the return to capital in developing
countries is not that much higher than in the
developed world. Recent work produces
indirect estimates of rates of return that sup-
port this view (see, for example, Caselli 2005
and Caselli and James Feyrer 2007). There
are still relatively few studies that attempt to
measure the rate of return to capital in
developing countries directly. In my view,
this continues to be an important gap in the
literature.
6.1.3 Capital Market Imperfections
A third explanation for the relatively small
financial impact of liberalization is that
developing countries really do have higher
rates of return to capital but the presence of
capital market imperfections, such as agency
problems, asymmetric information, and poor
investor protection, leads to a persistent
return differential between rich and poor
countries (Stulz 2005).
Investor protection matters. Where
accounting standards and enforcement bod-
ies do not exist to restrain insiders, resources
invested in a company may be wasted on
superfluous managerial perks or even stolen
outright (Michael C. Jensen 1986). The
insiders may be controlling shareholders,
such as a founding family, a firm’s top man-
agers, or both. Because outside investors
know less than insiders about the firm’s
prospects and the behavior of its managers,
they will demand higher returns or simply
not invest.
Strong investor protection can help to mit-
igate problems of agency and asymmetric
information by providing minority sharehold-
ers with mechanisms to restrain insiders. A
large body of research demonstrates that the
degree to which a country’s laws protect the
legal rights of minority shareholders exerts a
significant influence on the size and robust-
ness of capital markets (Rafael La Porta et al.
1997, 1998, 2002). Firms located in countries
with strong investor protection have greater
access to external finance, invest more, and
have higher valuations than their counter-
parts in countries with weak investor protec-
tion (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2002; Andrei
Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 1997;
Raghuram G. Rajan 2000).23
911Henry: Capital Account Liberalization
23 In a related paper, Simon Johnson et al. (2000) show
that measures of investor protection do a better job of
explaining stock market declines during the Asian Crisis
than do standard macro variables.
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Conversely, investors will stay away from
countries in which investor protection is
weak (Rudiger Dornbusch 2000, p. 92).
Table 3 shows that the eighteen emerging
economies that liberalized their stock mar-
kets rank lower than developed countries
on five commonly used measures of
investor protection: the rule of law, efficien-
cy of the judicial system, contract repudia-
tion, expropriation risk, and the accounting
system. Weak investor protection decreases
effective returns, thereby reducing the
incentive for capital to flow from rich to
poor countries (Shleifer and Daniel
Wolfenzon 2002).24 Because investors in
emerging economies receive less protection
than their counterparts in rich countries,
lifting restrictions on capital inflows may
generate smaller changes in asset prices and
capital flows than would occur if emerging
economies gave investors the same average
level of protection they receive in developed
economies.
912 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLV (December 2007)
24 See also the discussion in Charles P. Himmelberg,
Robert Glenn Hubbard, and Inessa Love (2004).
TABLE 2
THE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE OF EMERGING MARKETS IS WEAKER THAN THAT OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Hall and Jones Heritage House World Bank Doing World Economic
Index Index Business Index Forum Index
Argentina 77 23 101 69
Brazil 68 87 121 66
Chile 43 15 28 27
Colombia 79 73 79 65
India 87 126 134 43
Indonesia 45 76 135 50
Jordan 34 58 78 52
Malaysia 22 42 25 26
Mexico 64 91 43 58
Nigeria 116 97 108 101
Pakistan 113 107 74 91
Philippines 90 69 126 71
South Korea 33 33 23 24
Taiwan 28 16 47 13
Thailand 20 38 18 35
Turkey 71 49 91 59
Venezuela 53 99 104 88
Zimbabwe 94 122 153 119
Emerging Market Average 63 68 83 59
Developed Country Average 14 14 23 15
Notes: Table 2 compares the average quality of the economic infrastructure of the eighteen emerging economies
that liberalized (see table 1) with that of the G-7 countries, using four commonly employed measures of the qual-
ity of economic institutions. All four indices rank countries in descending order of quality (e.g., a ranking of 1
indicates superior quality, while a ranking of 130 indicates poor quality). The rankings in column 2 are based on
the Hall and Jones (1999) measure of social infrastructure, which ranks 130 countries. Column 3 uses Heritage
House’s Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage House 2006), which ranks 161 countries. Column 4 uses the
World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index (World Bank 2006), which ranks 175 countries. The rankings in col-
umn 5 are based on the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum 2006),
which ranks 125 countries. “Average Emerging Market” is the average ranking, on each index, of the eighteen
emerging economies that liberalized. “Average Developed Country” is the average G-7 country ranking on each
index.
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Although table 3 corroborates the basic
story, an important question for future
research is the extent to which the capital-
market-imperfections view truly explains the
relatively small financial impact of liberaliza-
tion. For instance, an empirical prediction of
the market-imperfections view is that the
impact of liberalization should be larger in
countries that have stronger investor protec-
tion. Unfortunately, the policy-experiment
approach is not well-suited to test this predic-
tion. With typically no more than twenty-five
countries that meet the criteria for sample
inclusion, there are simply not enough data
points to conduct precise tests of the cross-
sectional prediction that liberalization will
have a larger impact in countries with
stronger investor protection.25
In a related exercise that is not a study of
liberalization per se, Alfaro, Sebnem
Kalemli-Ozcan, and Vadym Volosovych
(forthcoming) try to determine whether the
capital-market-imperfections view or the
weak-institutions view has greater empiri-
cal relevance for the observed pattern of
913Henry: Capital Account Liberalization
25 Menzie D. Chinn and Hiro Ito (2006) do find that
countries whose financial systems have a higher level of
legal and institutional development benefit more from
capital account openness but, like other cross-sectional
studies, the paper examines the correlation between
openness and financial development, not the impact of
opening on financial development.
TABLE 3
INVESTOR PROTECTION IN EMERGING MARKETS IS WEAKER THAN IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Rule of Judicial Contract Expropriation Accounting
Law Efficiency Repudiation Risk Standards
Argentina 5.4 6.0 4.9 5.9 4.5
Brazil 6.3 5.8 6.3 7.6 5.4
Chile 7.0 7.3 6.8 7.5 5.2
Colombia 2.1 7.3 7.0 7.0 5
India 4.2 8.0 6.1 7.8 5.7
Indonesia 4.0 2.5 6.1 7.2 NA
Jordan 4.4 8.7 4.9 6.1 NA
Malaysia 6.8 9.0 7.4 8.0 7.6
Mexico 5.4 6.0 6.6 7.3 6
Nigeria 2.7 7.3 4.4 5.3 5.9
Pakistan 3.0 5.0 4.9 5.6 NA
Philippines 2.7 4.8 4.8 5.2 6.5
South Korea 5.4 6.0 8.6 8.3 6.2
Taiwan NA NA NA NA NA
Thailand 6.3 3.3 7.6 7.4 6.4
Turkey 5.2 4.0 6.0 7.0 5.1
Venezuela 6.4 6.5 6.3 6.9 4
Zimbabwe 3.7 7.5 5.0 5.6 NA
Emerging Market Mean 4.8 6.2 6.1 6.8 5.7
Developed Country Mean 9.1 9.2 9.2 9.5 6.4
Notes: Table 3 compares the average quality of investor protection in the eighteen emerging economies that lib-
eralized (see table 1) with that of the G-7 countries, using five measures employed by LaPorta, López-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). All scores are based on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 indicating the highest quality and 1
the lowest. The source for all of the numbers in this table is LaPorta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998).
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asset prices and capital flows to emerging
economies. They construct a measure of
the strength of institutions for a large cross-
section of countries using variables from
Political Risk Service’s International
Country Risk Guide. As a proxy for inter-
national capital market imperfections, they
construct a measure of economic “remote-
ness” that they interpret as capturing infor-
mational frictions as in Joshua D. Coval and
Tobias J. Moskowitz (1999, 2001) and
Richard Portes and Helene Rey (2005).
In running horse races between the two
views, Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and
Volosovych (forthcoming) find that their
measure of institutions explains over half of
the variation in FDI and portfolio flows as a
fraction of GDP. They interpret their find-
ing as indicative of the primacy of weak
institutions over capital market imperfec-
tions for explaining the paucity of capital
flows to developing countries. One problem
with their interpretation is that it is not clear
that economic remoteness is the right proxy
for capital market imperfections such as
agency problems and investor protection.
Furthermore, it is also difficult to say where
institutional quality ends and capital market
imperfections begin. Poor institutions (e.g.,
the absence of property rights) lead to mar-
ket imperfections such as weak investor pro-
tection. While it is not clear that one can
successfully distinguish between the institu-
tions view and the capital market imperfec-
tions view using aggregate cross-country
data, the Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and
Volosovych (forthcoming) paper does pro-
vide empirical support for the notion that
the myriad of potential distortions not
explicitly modeled in the neoclassical frame-
work can account for some of the Lucas
(1990) paradox.26
6.2 Can We Believe the Investment
Results?
Although the financial impact of stock
market liberalization is small relative to pre-
dictions, the evidence in section 5.2 demon-
strates that it is apparently still large enough
to have significant effects on real invest-
ment. However, it is not clear how much
confidence we should place in results that
attribute economywide investment booms to
a policy change that affects directly only
those firms that are traded on the stock mar-
ket. In most emerging economies, the eco-
nomic activity of stock-market-listed firms
accounts for a relatively small fraction of
GDP, so it is natural to ask whether the
aggregate investment booms that occur in
the aftermath of liberalizations may be plau-
sibly linked with events that partially open a
single component of the capital account.
For instance, the establishment of a coun-
try fund is the modal means through which
the policy-experiment approach identifies
capital account liberalization dates. The size
of a country fund is typically small relative to
the size of the liberalizing country’s capital
stock. The Chilean liberalization listed in
table 1 illustrates the point. Chile liberalized
its stock market in May 1987 and the vehicle
through which it did so was the Toronto
Trust Mutual Fund, a Canadian closed-end
fund with a net asset value of 37.7 million
U.S. dollars.27 A capital inflow of this size is
not large enough to account for the size of
Chile’s subsequent investment boom.
Because the capital stock of publicly traded
Chilean firms is a subset of the entire econ-
omy’s, to illustrate the point it is sufficient to
show that 37.7 million dollars is small rela-
tive to the increase in the capital stock of the
publicly traded firms. In 1987, Chile’s stock
market capitalization was 5.34 billion U.S.
dollars and the ratio of the market value of
assets to book value was 0.7. This means that
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27 See Park and Van Agtmael (1993), Price (1994), and
Wilson (1992).
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the book value of assets was roughly 7.63 bil-
lion U.S. dollars at the time Chile liberal-
ized. In the five years after liberalization,
Chile experienced abnormal capital stock
growth of 2.2 percentage points per year.
Applying this growth number to the capital
stock in a continuously compounded fashion
for the next five years adds an additional 890
million dollars of productive assets to the
economy. The 37.7 million dollar capital
inflow can account for less than 5 percent of
this increase.
The apparent incongruity of these num-
bers forces harder thinking about the validi-
ty of the empirical link between
liberalization and real investment. In doing
so, an important point to keep in mind is that
the policy-experiment approach uses coun-
try-fund openings as observable de facto
indicators of harder-to-pinpoint de jure pol-
icy changes.28 If country-fund dates are valid
proxies for the occurrence of broader,
undocumented liberalizations, then signifi-
cant quantities of capital may flow in
through stock markets that are not part of
any particular country fund. If that is the
case, then the size of the initial country fund
will understate the quantity of resources that
stock market liberalizations make available
to finance an increase in the domestic capi-
tal stock. Three facts suggest that closed-end
country fund dates do indeed provide non-
specious indicators of a larger move toward
open capital markets.
First, a steady stream of country funds and
issuances of American Depository Receipts
typically follow stock market liberalizations
(Karolyi 2004; Juan Carlos Gozzi, Levine,
and Sergio L. Schmukler forthcoming). In
the case of Chile, six additional country
funds with a cumulative net asset value of
991.8 million dollars were established
between 1987 and 1992.29 More generally,
table 4 shows that aggregate net equity
inflows to emerging equity markets rise
sharply following the median date of coun-
try-fund openings. In principle, when capital
flows into the stock market, the economy as
a whole need not experience net capital
inflows because foreign investors could be
swapping debt for equity or the country
could experience debt outflows that are larg-
er than the inflow of portfolio equity. In
practice, however, the epoch of stock market
liberalization coincided with a period of
strong net capital inflows to developing
countries (Calvo, Leonardo Leiderman, and
Carmen M. Reinhart 1996).
Second, with the sole exception of
Malaysia during the Asian Crisis of 1997–98,
none of the stock market liberalization dates
from table 1 were followed by a reversal of
freedom of foreign access. Together with the
first fact, this second fact confirms that stock
market liberalizations indicate a discrete
change in capital account policy that signi-
fies the beginning of a steady march toward
greater freedom of capital inflows.
Third, stock market liberalizations coincide
with a significant increase in the importation
of capital goods. In a sample of twenty-five
countries that liberalized their stock markets
between 1980 and 1997, liberalization leads
to a 6 percent increase in capital goods as a
fraction of total imports and the share of total
machine imports to GDP rises by 12 percent
(Alfaro and Eliza Hammel 2007). Because
developing countries do not produce a signif-
icant portion of the capital goods they use,
the observation that imports of capital goods
rise in concert with the advent of portfolio
equity inflows increases confidence in earli-
er work on liberalization and aggregate
investment.
6.3 Are the Growth Effects Plausible?
The increase in economic growth due to
liberalization is about one percent per year
after controlling for a host of variables
(Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 2005). That
estimate is inconsistent with the neoclassical
915Henry: Capital Account Liberalization
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facto versus de jure indicators.
29 See Park and Van Agtmael (1993), Price (1994), and
Wilson (1992).
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theory on which it is based.30 To see why,
recall that the growth rate of capital increas-
es by about one percent per year following
stock market liberalizations and that the
elasticity of output with respect to capital is
roughly one-third. Therefore, a one-per-
centage-point increase in the growth rate of
the capital stock cannot raise the growth rate
of GDP per capita by much more than one-
third of a percentage point.
Within the standard neoclassical frame-
work, any increase in the growth rate of out-
put not due to an increase in the growth rate
of capital and labor must be the result of an
increase in the growth rate of total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP). For the eighteen countries
in table 1, the growth rate of TFP does rise
from an average of 0.19 percent per year in
the five years preceding stock market liberal-
ization to an average of 1.82 percent per year
in the subsequent five. But one cannot glibly
attribute the increase in TFP growth to stock
market liberalization. The operative channel
from liberalization to growth in the neoclassi-
cal model runs strictly through capital accu-
mulation. Total factor productivity does not
enter into the story.31
Of course, if one is willing to step outside
the neoclassical model, there are many sto-
ries in which liberalization can raise total
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30 See the discussion on page 19 and page 22 of Kose et
al. (2006).
31 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Olivier Jeanne (2006)
argue that the welfare effects of capital account liberaliza-
tion in the neoclassical model are de minimus precisely
because liberalization has no impact on total factor pro-
ductivity.
TABLE 4
COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL INFLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1970–95
Average 1970–74 Average 1975–79 Average 1980–84 Average 1985–89 Average 1990–95
Millions Percent Millions Percent Millions Percent Millions Percent Millions Percent
of dollars of total of dollars of total of dollars of total of dollars of total of dollars of total
Net Resource 12529.1 32836.8 51604.7 32726.2 90184.1
Flows
Net Flows 10121.3 80.8 27151.3 82.7 42374.6 82.1 20563.4 62.8 45316.2 50.2
on Debt
(PPG+PNG)
Public and 5628.0 44.9 18014.0 54.9 28383.4 55.0 14844.5 45.4 12820.5 14.2
Publicly
Guaranteed
Debt (PPG)
Private 4493.4 35.9 9137.3 27.8 13991.2 27.1 5718.9 17.5 32495.8 36.0
Nonguaranteed
Debt (PNG)
Foreign Direct 1798.6 14.4 4247.2 12.9 6871.7 13.3 9006.5 27.5 24993.8 27.7
Investment
Portfolio Equity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.0 0.1 762.2 2.3 16855.0 18.7
Grants 609.2 4.9 1438.3 4.4 2331.3 4.5 2394.2 7.3 3019.0 3.3 
Notes: This table presents data on the composition of aggregate net resource flows to the eighteen developing
countries listed in table 1 (with the exceptions of South Korea and Taiwan, for which no data were available)
from 1970 to 1995. All data come from the World Bank’s Global Development Finance Data Base. The first col-
umn of the table lists all the components of net resource flows. Net resource flows are the sum of net resource
flows on public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt, private nonguaranteed (PNG) debt, foreign direct invest-
ment, portfolio equity, and official grants. Public and publicly guaranteed debt is an external obligation of a pri-
vate debtor that is guaranteed for repayment by a public entity. Private nonguaranteed external debt is an exter-
nal obligation of a private debtor that is not guaranteed for repayment by a public entity. Columns 2 through 6
display the data as averages over five-year intervals.
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factor productivity. For instance, liberaliza-
tion may enable firms to import more pro-
ductive machinery (e.g., tractors instead of
hoes) that effectively shift production in the
country closer to the world technology fron-
tier. Also, FDI in the form of green field
investments or the purchase of a majority
stake of a domestic firm may bring new
technology and management techniques
that increase the efficiency of the acquired
firm and generate economywide knowledge
spillovers. For instance, Frederic S.
Mishkin (2006) argues that developing
countries can import greater financial effi-
ciency by allowing foreign investors to take
controlling stakes in domestic financial
firms and bring in state-of-the-art financial
intermediation practices. More generally,
he articulates how capital account liberal-
ization could raise total factor productivity
by imposing capital market discipline on
governments, breaking up local monopo-
lies, and broadly promoting a whole range
of institutional improvements that Kose et
al. (2006) refer to as “collateral benefits” of
financial globalization.
These stories are theoretically plausible
but empirically unsubstantiated. There was a
significant increase in the TFP growth of
Mexican plants that changed from domestic
to majority foreign ownership in 1989
(Francisco Pérez González 2005). Similarly,
FDI in Venezuela also increased TFP
growth at the plant level (Brian J. Aitken and
Ann E. Harrison 1999).32 But there is no evi-
dence that plant-level productivity gains
generate economywide knowledge spillovers
that stimulate higher aggregate TFP growth
(Mona Haddad and Harrison 1993; Aitken
and Harrison 1999; Holger Gorg and David
Greenaway 2004).
Similarly, there is no rigorous evidence
that capital account liberalization improves
the allocative efficiency of the domestic
financial system.33 It is true that capital
account liberalization within a country tends
to increase financial development (Levine
2001; Levine and Zervos 1998a, 1998b). It is
also true that countries at high levels of
financial development allocate capital more
efficiently than countries at low levels of
financial development (Love 2003; Jeffrey
Wurgler 2000; Rajan and Luigi Zingales
1998; Eichengreen 2004). The temptation,
of course, is to invoke transitivity and con-
clude that capital account liberalization
increases domestic allocative efficiency. The
problem with such logic is that documenting
a positive correlation between the efficiency
of capital allocation and financial develop-
ment in a cross section of countries does not
permit us to infer that more financial devel-
opment within a given country will improve
its allocative efficiency. Without a convincing
body of time series evidence that the quality
of a country’s capital allocation improves as
its level of financial development rises, no
basis exists for concluding that liberalization
indirectly improves the efficiency of domes-
tic capital allocation through its impact on
financial development.34
I am not arguing that one cannot tell sto-
ries in which capital account liberalization
induces higher TFP growth. Again, once you
step outside the neoclassical model, there
are many possible channels. Liberalization
may ease liquidity constraints (Nandini
Gupta and Kathy Yuan 2005; Todd Mitton
2006), thereby enabling firms to adopt tech-
nologies that they could not finance prior to
the liberalization. Liberalization also facili-
tates increased risk sharing, which might
encourage investment in riskier, higher
growth technologies in the spirit of Obstfeld
(1994), Levine (1997), or Robert G. King
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32 For an analysis of the anticipated productivity gains
from FDI using stock market data, see Anusha Chari,
Paige P. Ouimet, and Linda L. Tesar (2004).
33 In fact, many economists argue for enhancing
domestic financial efficiency before liberalizing the capi-
tal account (see Dornbusch 1983; Edwards 1984; Ronald
I. McKinnon 1991; Mishkin 2007).
34 Arturo Galindo, Fabio Schiantarelli, and Andrew
Weiss (2007) provide some of the first evidence on this
subject of which I am aware.
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and Levine (1993). The point is that, while
the developing countries in this sample may
have increased their rate of adoption of new
production technologies during the late
1980s and early 1990s, there is no sound way
to draw such a conclusion from aggregate
data.
In contrast, the aggregate TFP growth
numbers are consistent with the readily
observable evidence on economic reforms.
As discussed in section 6.1.2, economic
reforms that raise the efficiency of a given
stock of capital and labor will increase TFP
and again table 1 shows that stock market
liberalizations typically coincide with a raft
of other such reforms. Of course, the only
way to distinguish between competing theo-
ries that can explain higher TFP in the after-
math of liberalization is to confront these
theories with data that have the power to
make such fine distinctions. Recent studies
of liberalization that move from aggregate to
firm-level data show the way forward.
7. Firm-Level Perspectives on Capital
Account Liberalization
Perhaps the most important shortcoming
of aggregate data is its limited ability to help
us understand whether countries that liber-
alize efficiently allocate the capital that flows
in. While the rise in aggregate stock prices
and investment documented in the literature
suggests that liberalization promotes some
efficient movement of capital between coun-
tries, it says nothing about the efficiency of
capital allocation within countries. Within-
country efficiency would require that the
stream of capital from developed countries
get allocated to the highest return sectors
within the emerging economies to which it
flows.
The efficiency of capital allocation is
closely related to the cost of capital. For
instance, the larger the fall in a country’s
cost of capital, the more its investment
should increase. In other words, cross-coun-
try changes in investment in the aftermath
of liberalizations should be negatively corre-
lated with cross-country changes in the cost
of capital on impact. The problem is that the
small-sample-size problem inherent in the
policy-experiment approach once again does
not provide sufficient power to say anything
meaningful about the empirical relevance of
this hypothesis.
Similarly, aggregate data are of little use in
helping us understand the role of interna-
tional risk sharing, a subject that also has
important efficiency implications and is of
broad interest in the literature.35 Because
the cost of capital matters for investment and
risk sharing matters for the cost of capital, it
is natural to wonder about the importance of
risk sharing relative to the fall in the interest
rate for the overall change in liberalizing
countries’ cost of capital. Unfortunately,
studies of liberalization that use aggregate
data provide no help on this point. For each
country, aggregate data supply one observ-
able proxy for the change in the cost of capi-
tal—the stock market revaluation discussed
in section 5. But there are two forces at work:
the change in risk sharing and the change in
the interest rate. Since one data point is not
sufficient to identify two effects, it is impossi-
ble to disentangle them using aggregate
data.36
Firm-level data, on the other hand, pro-
vide more than sufficient degrees of free-
dom with which to disentangle the impact of
risk sharing from that of the interest rate.
This section reviews how recent work uses
such data to gain a better understanding of
risk sharing and the allocation of capital
within countries. More generally, this sec-
tion explains how recent firm-level studies
918 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLV (December 2007)
35 For surveys of the literature on international risk
sharing, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), chapter 5.
36 If we could observe internal, market-determined
risk-free rates before and after liberalizations, disentan-
gling the two effects would be straightforward. The prob-
lem is that almost all of the countries listed in table 1 had
some form of financial repression in place at the time they
liberalized (see tables 1, 4, and 5 in John Williamson and
Molly Mahar 1998). Hence, we do not observe market-
determined, risk-free rates.
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enhance our understanding of the real
effects of liberalization.
7.1 Risk Sharing and Asset Prices
The country-level organizing framework
in section 5.1 extends naturally to a firm-
level setting that lays bare the risk-sharing
content of stock-price revaluations. The key
idea is that the changes that occur in firms’
stock prices at the time of liberalization
embody signals about the impact of liberal-
ization on the firms’ fundamentals. If capital
allocation is efficient, then firms’ investment
decisions should respond to these signals.
An efficient allocation of capital is one that
satisfies the first-order condition for invest-
ment. Recall that, before liberalization
occurs, the first-order condition for aggre-
gate investment requires the expected mar-
ginal product of the aggregate capital stock
to be equal to the aggregate cost of equity
capital plus the rate of depreciation. The dif-
ference between the first-order condition
for the economy as a whole and that for an
individual firm lies in the equity premium.
Whereas the aggregate equity premium is
proportional to the variance of the return on
the domestic market, Var(r∼M), the equity
premium for an individual firm is propor-
tional to the covariance of the firm’s return
with the local market.
Written in symbols to express it more con-
cisely, the first-order condition for an individ-
ual firm’s investment before liberalization is:
(12)     (r∼i,r∼M) + δ,
where the i subscripts indicate that we are
now talking about a single firm instead of
the entire economy. Liberalizing a country’s
stock market changes the relevant source of
systematic risk for pricing a firm’s shares
from the local stock market index to a world
stock market index. Due to this change, the
first-order condition for investment after
liberalization is:
(13)   (r∼i,r∼W) + δ,′ = +f k r COVi e( )∗ ∗ γ
′ = +f k r COVi
e( ) γ
where COV(r∼i,r∼W) is the covariance of firm
i’s return with the world market. Subtracting
equation (13) from equation (12) gives a use-
ful expression for the change in the first-
order condition from before-to-after
liberalization:
(14)     ,
where DIFCOVi = COV(r∼i,r∼M) − COV(r∼i,r∼W).
The right-hand-side of equation (14) high-
lights the two channels through which liber-
alization changes a firm’s cost of capital.
Moving from left to right, the first term is
exactly the same as in the aggregate case: a
fall in the risk-free rate as the country switch-
es from financial autarky to financial integra-
tion with the world market. This is a common
shock to all firms in the economy. The second
effect is unique to each firm: the greater the
covariance of the firm’s stock return with the
local market relative to the covariance of its
return with the world market, the larger the
change in the firm-specific component of its
cost of capital.
In the pristine world of theory, liberaliza-
tion does not alter the firm’s expected future
cash flow and the response of the firm’s stock
price to the news of the liberalization mirrors
exactly the change in its cost of capital. The
firm’s stock price will increase if liberalization
reduces the cost of capital and vice versa. In
other words, equation (14) predicts that each
firm’s revaluation will have an intercept term
and a slope term. The intercept term should
be the same across all firms within a given
country. As for the slope effect, if risk sharing
matters, then the revaluations that firms
experience should be an increasing function
of the variable DIFCOV.
In the murky world of empirical work, lib-
eralizations coincide with other economic
reforms that undoubtedly affect expected
future cash flows. Whereas aggregate studies
attempt to disentangle the impact of liberal-
ization from contemporaneous economic
reforms by using rough macroeconomic
indicators as proxies for cash flows (see
 ′ = − +f k r r DIFCOVi
e
i( ) ( )
∗ γ
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equation (11) in section 5.3), firm-level
studies control directly for changes in cash
flows by using the real value of sales and
earnings taken from firms’ income state-
ments. More generally, although the econo-
my as a whole benefits from liberalization,
firms that gain more will expand, while
those that gain less (or lose) may contract.37
Because the process of liberalization gener-
ates losers as well as winners, it raises
important questions of political economy
that aggregate data cannot answer. In con-
trast, firm-level data allow researchers to
control for the differential impact of liberal-
ization across various sectors of the econo-
my and therefore may help to answer some
of these questions (see section 8.2).
Recent work supports the two asset-pric-
ing predictions of equation (14). First, firms
experience significant stock price revalua-
tions during liberalizations, controlling for
the impact of contemporaneous reforms on
expected future cash flows (Chari and Henry
2004; Dilip K. Patro and John K. Wald
2005). Second, the stock price change asso-
ciated with liberalization is positively and
significantly related to DIFCOV. In a sample
of 430 firms from eight countries, the aver-
age firm-level revaluation is about 15 per-
cent in real dollar terms, changes in
firm-specific covariances explain roughly
one-third of the revaluation, and the com-
mon shock is the same for all firms (Chari
and Henry 2004).
The finding that stock prices of firms in
emerging markets move in accordance with
changes in systematic risk provides some of
the first empirical support for the CAPM in
a domestic or international setting.38 It also
runs counter to recent work which finds that
stock returns in emerging economies gener-
ally contain little firm-specific information
(Randall K. Morck, Bernard Yeung, and
Wayne Yu 2000). These two facts make you
wonder whether the firm-level asset pricing
results are spurious. Two observations sug-
gest otherwise.
First, the empirical design of the firm-
level policy-experiment approach gives it
power to uncover cross-sectional relation-
ships between expected returns and system-
atic risk that are difficult to detect in other
settings. Covariances are measured with
error (Fama and Kenneth R. French 2004),
and measurement error reduces the statisti-
cal power of any regression. Instead of test-
ing for a relationship between levels of
returns and levels of systematic risk, the
firm-level policy-experiment approach
focuses on episodes where there are large
changes in both risk and returns. The mag-
nitude of the liberalization-induced changes
in expected returns and systematic risk asso-
ciated with opening up the economy to for-
eign capital flows may simply dominate the
attenuating effects of measurement error
that usually plague efforts to find cross-sec-
tional pricing relationships. Similarly,
changes in emerging-market stock prices
may convey little firm-specific information
in general, but they do convey such informa-
tion during episodes like liberalizations
when the magnitude of the information is
sufficiently large.39
Second, using a similar approach to that of
Chari and Henry (2004), Tomas Dvorak and
Richard Podpiera (2006) also find that large
changes in systematic risk have explanatory
power for changes in the cross-section of
expected returns. The policy experiment
that provides the key source of variation for
Dvorak and Podpiera’s exercise is the addi-
tion of eight central and Eastern European
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37 See, for example, the impact of liberalization on the
expansion of big versus small firms documented in Gozzi,
Levine, and Schmukler (forthcoming).
38 Christopher Polk, Samuel Thompson, and Tuomo
Vuolteenaho (2006) also argue that the CAPM matters for
the cross section of stock prices. For surveys of the
CAPM’s empirical record, see Eugene F. Fama (1991),
John H. Cochrane (1999), and John Y. Campbell (2000).
Karolyi and Stulz (2001) discuss the international CAPM.
39 The firm-specific information in stock prices also
rises as countries adopt greater capital market openness
(Kan Li et al. 2004).
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countries into the European Union. Dvorak
and Podpiera (2006) argue that accession
into the European Union integrated the
stock markets of the acceding countries with
the rest of the world and thereby changed
the source of systematic risk facing investors
in the countries that gained membership. In
their sample of seventy-four firms, the dif-
ference between the beta of a firm’s stock
return with the local market and its beta with
the world market explains about 22 percent
of the typical stock price revaluation that
occurs with accession.
7.2 Risk Sharing and Resource Allocation
While the correlation between changes in
returns and changes in systematic risk pro-
vide some evidence of within-country effi-
ciency at the level of asset pricing, the more
pressing economic question is whether real
resource allocation—investment—responds
accordingly.40 As the benchmark for deter-
mining the firm’s hurdle rate for investment
switches from the local stock market index to
a world stock market index, efficiency
requires that allocation of the firm’s physical
capital also shift in accordance with the
change in the source of the country’s system-
atic risk.41 In order to restore equilibrium,
the increase in the firm’s capital stock must
be large enough to drive the expected mar-
ginal product down to the lower, postliberal-
ization cost of capital. Equation (14)
implicitly defines the size of the required
increase and therefore delivers two testable
predictions about investment.
The first prediction is that the common
shock to the cost of capital should cause the
average investment rate of all firms to rise.
The second prediction is that, given the
common shock, the firm-specific shock (the
change in covariance) implies that firms
whose equity premia fall should invest even
more than those whose premia rise. In other
words, if physical capital is reallocated in line
with the optimal smoothing of production
risk, then high DIFCOV firms should expe-
rience faster capital stock growth than low
DIFCOV firms following liberalization.
The first prediction about liberalization
and firm-level investment finds empirical
support in the literature. The growth rate of
the average firm’s capital stock exceeds its
preliberalization mean by an average of 3.8
percentage points per year (Chari and
Henry forthcoming). This effect is much
larger than the corresponding increase in the
aggregate capital stock over the same time
period (1.1 percentage points per year).
Because stock market liberalizations most
directly affect the investment incentives of
publicly traded firms, the firm-level invest-
ment results are more credible than the
aggregate results and make a stronger case
that liberalization does, indeed, have real
effects.42
The second prediction about liberalization
and firm-level investment enjoys rather less
empirical success. There is no evidence that
physical investment responds to changes in
systematic risk, and firm-specific changes in
equity premia (the DIFCOV variable) have
an economically trivial and statistically
insignificant effect on changes in invest-
ment.
The finding that firms’ investment deci-
sions are insensitive to firm-specific changes
in their cost of capital delivers a powerful
blow to the Allocative Efficiency view of lib-
eralization. On the other hand, with little
evidence from developed markets to suggest
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40 The idea of trying to relate changes in investment to
the liberalization-induced changes in stock prices follows
in the spirit of earlier work that tries to relate changes in
investment to changes in stock prices more generally
(Olivier Blanchard, Changyong Rhee, and Summers 1993;
Fischer and Robert C. Merton 1984; James Tobin and
William C. Brainard 1977).
41 For a helpful exposition on the resource-allocation
implications of changes in systematic risk, see Tesar and
Ingrid M. Werner (1998), pp. 290–92.
42 The firm-level investment data used by Chari and
Henry (forthcoming) comes from the International
Finance Corporation’s Corporate Finance Database. For
a detailed description of this dataset, see Asli Demirgüç-
Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic (1998) and Laurence
Booth et al. (2001).
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that exposure to aggregate covariance risk
drives expected returns, testing the hypothe-
sis that firms in developing countries allocate
physical investment in accordance with the
CAPM may seem to fly in the face of all
common sense.
But if the risk-sharing-resource-allocation
hypothesis is a straw man, then it is a very
popular one. Virtually all studies of interna-
tional risk sharing lean heavily on the intuition
that the gains to trade in risky assets stem
from the difference between the variance of
domestic returns (consumption) and the
covariance of domestic returns (consump-
tion) with the rest of the world (see, for exam-
ple, Stefano G. Athanasoulis and Eric Van
Wincoop 2000; Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996,
chapter 5; Karen K. Lewis 1999, 2000; and
Van Wincoop 1994, 1999).43 Furthermore,
the evidence shows that firm-level stock
prices do move in conjunction with liberaliza-
tion-induced changes in systematic risk. So
the real issue is why the reductions in risk
premia do not cause firms to adopt projects à
la Obstfeld (1994)—that were too risky to
undertake in the absence of international risk
sharing.
7.3 Other Firm-Level Approaches to
Liberalization and Efficiency
Testing whether liberalization-induced
changes in risk drive changes in asset prices
and investment provides one way of evaluat-
ing efficiency, but it is also useful to adopt a
broader perspective—one that is grounded
in theory but not tied so restrictively to the
CAPM. There is much to be learned about
the impact of capital account policy on real
variables by looking at firm-level data from a
number of different perspectives.
For instance, another way to tackle the
question of liberalization and allocative
efficiency is to turn the policy-experiment
approach on its head. In addition to looking
at how firms respond to liberalization, it
may be just as instructive to study how
firms respond when countries impose
restrictions on capital inflows (Kristin J.
Forbes 2007b). If capital account liberaliza-
tion enhances efficiency, then imposing
capital controls should diminish efficiency
in at least two important ways. First, capital
controls may reduce the supply of capital,
thereby raising the cost of borrowing and
tightening the financing constraints faced
by domestic firms. Second, by reducing the
supply of capital, capital controls can
decrease competition and market disci-
pline, permitting firms that might not sur-
vive if their competitors had access to
credit to flourish behind closed borders
(Rajan and Zingales 2003; Johnson and
Mitton 2003; Morck, David A. Stangeland,
and Yeung 2000).
A number of papers examine the extent to
which the presence of capital controls exac-
erbates the financing constraints faced by
various kinds of firms. In the spirit of Steven
M. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen
(1988), the basic test involves the examina-
tion of the sensitivity of investment to cash
flow.44 Forbes (2007a) uses the 1991–98
episode of El Encaje, the tax on capital
inflows to Chile, as a policy experiment with
which to assess the efficiency implications of
imposing capital controls.45 Her analysis
begins with the following observation. In
developed countries, small, publicly traded
firms exhibit higher investment growth than
large, publicly traded firms. Forbes (2007a)
finds that this is also the case in Chile before
1991 and after 1998. During El Encaje, how-
ever, she finds that the investment growth of
small firms drops below that of large firms.
She goes on to show that El Encaje increased
the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for
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44 For a detailed discussion of the literature on financing
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small, publicly traded firms whereas the sen-
sitivity of large firms was unaffected. In
economies in which small firms drive pro-
ductivity increases, Forbes’s results might
suggest one channel through which capital
account liberalization could affect TFP. To
know whether this is the case, we need more
research on the extent to which large versus
small firms drive TFP growth in developing
countries.
In contrast to Forbes’s case study,
Harrison, Love, and Margaret S. McMillan
(2004) use a cross-country, firm-level panel
data set to study the impact of capital
account restrictions. They take their meas-
ures of capital account restrictions from the
IMF publication AREAER discussed in sec-
tion 3. Like Forbes (2007a), they find that
the presence of capital account restrictions
increases the sensitivity of firms’ investment
to cash flow. They also document that the
sensitivity of domestically owned firms’
investment to cash flow is greater than that
of firms with foreign ownership or assets.
In a paper that reverts back to the easing of
capital controls, Luc Laeven (2003) con-
structs a cross-country data set to address the
question of whether financial liberalization
eases financing constraints and increases
competition. Financial liberalization typically
refers to the removal of interest rate ceilings,
directed credit, and other such distortions in
the domestic financial markets.46 Laeven’s
paper has implications for capital-account
liberalization because his measure of finan-
cial liberalization captures the impact of FDI
(i.e., foreign entry) into the domestic banking
sector. As such, it has some power to speak to
the issue of whether foreign bank entry
increases the supply of capital and makes the
domestic lending market more competitive.
He finds that the sensitivity of small firms’
investment to cash flow falls by 80 percent as
a result of financial liberalization. He also
finds that the investment of large firms
becomes more sensitive to cash flow after
financial liberalization and interprets this
finding as evidence that large firms may have
had access to preferential credit before
financial liberalization.
One important weakness of firm-level
papers that examine the efficiency implica-
tions of capital controls is their interpretation
of the sensitivity of investment to cash flow as
a measure of firm-financing constraints. If
firms face financing frictions, then their
investment will be sensitive to cash flow. But
the converse of the preceding statement
need not be true: sensitivity of investment to
cash flow does not imply that firms face
financial constraints (Steven N. Kaplan and
Zingales 1997, 2000; Jeremy C. Stein 2003).
While there are multiple interpretations of
the investment–cash-flow sensitivity of
emerging-market firms and it remains to be
seen how all of the results reviewed in this
section will stand up to further scrutiny, there
is little question that papers which use firm-
level data provide two steps forward: (1) they
increase our understanding of the transmis-
sion mechanisms through which capital-
account policy affects the real economy and
(2) they provide a blueprint of how to con-
struct firm-level identification strategies for
disentangling those mechanisms.
7.4 Important Areas for Future Research:
Capital Outflows and Consumption
Data
In spite of the progress made in this area,
an important limitation of existing firm-level
studies on the benefits of risk sharing is their
almost-exclusive focus on (1) the investment
and production side of the economy as
opposed to consumption and welfare and (2)
the removal of restrictions on capital inflows
as opposed to capital outflows.
The largest future welfare gains to capital
account liberalization in developing coun-
tries such as China and India are likely to
come from the reduction in consumption and
income volatility that will occur when their
governments liberalize capital outflows,
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thereby permitting their citizens to hold
assets abroad and unload some of the sys-
tematic risk of the domestic economy.
Beyond the headline-grabbing examples of
China and India, there may also be large wel-
fare gains to permitting capital outflows from
countries such as Chile, Malaysia, and
Taiwan that have government-managed or 
government-mandated funded retirement
programs that are heavily tilted toward
domestic assets.
Because of developing countries’ long his-
tory of legal restrictions on capital outflows,
past research in this area focused on ways
that these countries could enjoy the welfare
benefits of external portfolio diversification
without permitting net capital outflows
(Donald R. Lessard 1973, 1974, 1994; Zvi
Bodie and Merton 2002). With the rise of
sovereign wealth funds and the apparent
impetus toward greater easing of restrictions
on the investment of capital abroad, there
would seem to be ample opportunities to
identify relevant policy experiments in the
area of liberalization of capital outflows.47
In light of these recent developments, the
glaring absence of empirical research on the
actual (as opposed to hypothetical) welfare
impact of the liberalization of capital outflows
from developing countries practically cries out
for further research. Given the difficulties
with aggregate data mentioned earlier, sub-
stantial contributions to research in the area of
risk sharing, welfare, and the liberalization of
capital outflows are most likely to come from
analyses of household-level consumption and
portfolio data. Using the cross-sectional varia-
tion in such data in conjunction with ma-
jor policy changes may lead to useful and 
convincing empirical identification strategies.
8. Do Liberalizations Cause Crises?
Stock market liberalizations deliver unde-
niable benefits over the short-to-medium
term but, viewed over a more extensive hori-
zon, the data raise questions about the
longer-run cost–benefit trade-off. For
instance, extending figures 4 and 5 to ten
years beyond the liberalization dates in table
1 would reveal the collapse in investment
and output associated with the Asian Crisis.
In addition to its effect on real variables,
there is the additional question of whether
liberalizations also amplify the cycle in asset
prices (Graciela Laura Kaminsky and
Schmukler 2002). For instance, in contrast
to the efficient-markets prediction that there
should be no revaluation of assets once mar-
kets are open to foreign investors, equity
prices continue to rise for two to three years
after stock market liberalizations but then
lose significant value over the longer term
(Martell and Stulz 2003). At first glance, the
boom–bust cycle in output, investment, and
asset prices seems consistent with the view
that liberalizations cause crises, but there
are at least three important points to keep in
mind.
First, crises occur not only in countries
that liberalize the capital account, but also in
those where capital controls are in place
(Forbes 2007b). There is, in fact, some sys-
tematic evidence that the occurrence of
crises and the imposition of capital controls
are positively correlated (Reuven Glick and
Michael Hutchison 2000; Eichengreen
2003). So it is equally plausible that bad pol-
icy precipitates crises and countries impose
capital controls as a way to postpone the
financial-market consequences (such as
depreciation of the currency) of weak or
deteriorating fundamentals. In other words,
at least some of the existing evidence sup-
ports the notion that poor macroeconomic
policies, not capital account liberalizations,
cause crises.
Second, when trying to determine whether
liberalizations or fundamentals cause crises,
it is important to think critically about timing.
The median stock market liberalization date
in table 1 is 1989—five years prior to the
Mexican Crisis of December 1994 and
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almost a decade before the Asian crisis of
1997. Given the length of time between the
onset of stock market liberalizations and
the rash of subsequent emerging-market
financial crises, any causal link between the
two is far from obvious. Of course, the
seeds of a misguided policy may take a long
time to yield their bitter fruit, so lags in tim-
ing alone cannot dismiss the possibility that
stock market liberalizations played a role.
Nevertheless, the more proximate and
plausible cause of the crises would appear
to be a combination of fixed exchange rates
and the build-up of short-term dollar-
denominated debt: tesobonos in the case of
Mexico and interbank loans in the case of
Asia (Fischer 2001; Krueger 2000; Mishkin
1997, 2000; Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995).
The question of whether stock market lib-
eralizations or short-term debt caused the
Mexican and Asian crises raises the third and
most important point: cost–benefit analyses of
capital account liberalization do not make
sense without specifying exactly what is meant
by the term “capital account liberalization.”
In its broadest form, a capital account liberal-
ization can be any decision by a country’s gov-
ernment that allows capital to flow more
freely in and (or) out of that country. Allowing
domestic businesses to take out loans from
foreign banks, permitting foreigners to pur-
chase domestic government debt instru-
ments, and allowing foreigners to invest in the
domestic stock market are but three exam-
ples. At a minimum, we need to distinguish
between two categories of liberalization:
those that involve debt and those that involve
equity. The distinction matters because the
answer to the question—do liberalizations
cause crises—depends critically on whether
you are talking about the liberalization of debt
or equity flows.
8.1 The Importance of Distinguishing Debt
from Equity
A debt contract requires regular payments
regardless of the borrower’s circumstances.
This means that, when bad news arises,
creditors rush to get their money while they
can. An equity contract, on the other hand,
involves risk-sharing—large payouts for
shareholders when times are good and little
to nothing when times are bad. It may seem
that foreign purchase of equities on the
domestic stock market could be reversed if
and when foreign investors become con-
cerned about a country’s prospects, but share-
holders cannot simply demand their money
back. They have to sell their shares and prices
will drop as soon as other market participants
(domestic or foreign) anticipate the increase
in supply. Furthermore, as prices fall, expect-
ed returns rise so that the incentive to sell
equity is no longer as strong (Hyuk Choe,
Bong-Chan Kho, and Stulz 1999). In other
words, servicing an equity contract involves
procyclical payments that tend to stabilize the
balance of payments, whereas debt service
payments are countercyclical and have the
opposite effect.
Because it does not embody risk-sharing,
excessive reliance on debt can cause finan-
cial distress. In the 1970s, developing-coun-
try governments obtained large quantities of
floating-rate commercial bank loans. The
Debt Crisis of the 1980s then demonstrated
that debt contracts can induce large ineffi-
ciencies when economic conditions turn out
to be worse than anticipated at the time the
contract was signed (Fischer 1987). Nor is it
simply the flow of asset-service payments
that is more likely to vary in a stabilizing way
for equity than for debt. “The debt crisis
was caused most immediately and powerful-
ly by the cutoff in new lending without any
similar curb on the requirement to pay
amortization” (Williamson 1997, p. 288).
Williamson’s point about the cessation of
new lending rings particularly true in the
context of the further distinction between
bonds and bank loans. The nature of bank
lending makes that form of capital flows far
more volatile than portfolio bond or equity
flows. For instance, domestic banks borrow
short-term in the foreign interbank market
with the expectation that they will be able to
925Henry: Capital Account Liberalization
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roll over the loans. The potential problems
here are twofold. First, the decision by
lenders to call in loans and cease rolling
them over tends to be driven not by idiosyn-
cratic shocks to individual borrowers but
common shocks to the domestic economy
(Wendy Dobson and Gary Clyde Hufbauer
2001). Second, common shocks dominate
idiosyncratic shocks in emerging markets
(Morck, Yeung, and Yu 2000). Taken togeth-
er, these two facts create the potential for
large-scale reversals of short-term interbank
loans.
Yet the vast majority of bank lending to
emerging markets takes the form of short-
term bank loans (loans with a maturity of less
than a year).48 At the end of 1997, 55 per-
cent of foreign bank loans worldwide were
short-term and one third of these loans were
of the interbank variety. For instance, for-
eign capital flows to Thailand peaked at 25.5
billion dollars in 1995; 75 percent of this sum
took the form of bank loans; two thirds of
these loans had maturities of less than a year,
and the majority went to Thai banks and
nonbank financial intermediaries (Martin N.
Baily, Diana Farrell, and Susan Lund 2000).
The critical point about interbank loans is
that they may be used by the recipient banks
to make loans to finance domestic projects
that may not be short-term, thereby creating
a liability mismatch. These liability mis-
matches wreak havoc on the domestic econ-
omy in the face of external shocks. Excessive
short-term borrowing in dollars from foreign
banks by Asian banks, companies, and gov-
ernments played a central role in the onset
of the Asian Financial Crisis (Jason Furman
and Stiglitz 1998; Steven Radelet and Sachs
1998). In essence, the mismatch between
the term structure of Asian borrowers’ assets
(long term) and their dollar-denominated
external liabilities (short term) meant that
any bad news that made their lenders reluc-
tant to extend new loans was bound to create
a liquidity problem.
The tendency toward sudden reversal of
short-term bank flows underscores the cen-
tral point of the discussion. Whereas portfo-
lio flows adjust to shocks through changes in
prices, short-term bank loans adjust through
quantities (Dobson and Hufbauer 2001).
Consequently, bank lending to emerging
markets is far more volatile than portfolio
investment in bonds or equities (Kose et al.
2006).49 Again, the Asian Crisis highlights
the difference in volatility. In 1996, the five
Asian Crisis countries (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, South Korea, Thailand)
received 47.8 billion dollars of capital
inflows in the form of bank loans; in 1997,
they experienced a collective outflow of 29.9
billion dollars—a reversal of almost 80 bil-
lion dollars in a one-year period (Baily,
Farrell, and Lund 2000).
In contrast to the abrupt reversal in bank
flows, portfolio flows remained positive in
Asia throughout 1997. Baily, Farrell, and
Lund (2000) document that aggregate port-
folio flows to the crisis countries fell by
about half but remained positive.
Furthermore, the aggregate pattern holds at
the individual country level for South Korea,
Malyasia, and Thailand. In the case of
Thailand, even as foreign banks were refus-
ing to roll over loans, portfolio flows
increased by 70 percent between the second
and third quarters of 1997 and remained
positive through the first half of 1998. The
authors document that Indonesia did experi-
ence net portfolio outflows in the fourth
quarter of 1997 but they turned positive
again by the middle of 1998.
Beyond the Asian Crisis, heavy short-term
borrowing in dollars played a central role in
precipitating almost every emerging-market
financial crisis during the 1990s (Dornbusch
926 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLV (December 2007)
48 As I discuss shortly, it is important to note that
bonds, which now comprise a much larger share of total
debt flows to developing countries than they did in the
1970s and 1980s, are potentially less problematic than
bank loans.
49 It is important to note that investment in bonds can
also be volatile if the bonds are sufficiently short-term.
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2000; Martin Feldstein 2002). A general
finding is that the ratio of short-term debt to
reserves predicts crises, and greater short-
term exposure predicts more severe crises
when positive capital flows turn negative
(Rodrik and Andres Velasco 2000).
8.2 If Debt Is So Risky, Why Do We See So
Much of It?
Table 4 illustrates the dominance of debt
over equity by breaking the composition of
net capital flows to the eighteen developing
countries listed in table 1 into five major cat-
egories: public and publicly guaranteed debt
flows, private nonguaranteed debt flows,
FDI, portfolio equity, and grants. The sum
of the first two categories reflects all debt
flows. From 1970 to 1984, debt typically
accounted for about 80 percent of all capital
flows to developing countries. If debt consti-
tutes such a dangerous form of lending, why
do we do we see so much of it relative to
equity? One obvious reason follows directly
from the discussion in section 5: prior to the
latter half of the 1980s, developing countries
largely banned foreigners from holding
domestic shares.
If debt is so risky relative to equity, then
why do governments liberalize debt inflows
by removing restrictions on offshore borrow-
ing by domestic banks while retaining hard
limits on foreign participation in the equity
market? There are number of competing
explanations for the relatively slow liberal-
ization of equity markets, all of which
deserve more serious consideration in future
research than the speculative treatment I
give them in the next few sentences.
Domestic capitalists in the nonfinancial sec-
tor of the economy may favor liberalization
because it reduces their cost of capital. But
these capitalists may also be reluctant to cre-
ate the necessary preconditions for success-
ful equity market liberalization (Shleifer and
Wolfenzon 2002). Alternatively, there may
be competing interests. Liberalization gen-
erates aggregate welfare gains, but there
may also be potential losers who oppose the
process (Rajan and Zingales 2003). For
example, domestic banks may lose monopoly
rents because liberalizations provide domes-
tic firms with alternative sources of financ-
ing. In turn, large, nonfinancial firms may be
worse off because new sources of financing
for their smaller, more financially con-
strained industry peers may increase prod-
uct market competition (Chari and Gupta
forthcoming). Finally, governments may
delay equity market liberalizations for an
entirely different set of considerations.
Future research should address these issues
using firm-level data.
Whatever explains the delay, with the
advent of stock market liberalization, portfo-
lio equity as a fraction of total capital inflows
rose from less than 0.1 percent in 1980–84 to
18.7 percent in 1990–95—an increase of
almost two-hundredfold. Debt as a fraction
of total capital flows fell from 82 percent in
1980–84 to 50 percent in 1990–95. FDI
flows as a fraction of total capital flows
increased from 13 percent in 1980–84 to 28
percent in 1990–95. However, the flow of
portfolio equity to emerging markets has
slowed since the boom of the early 1990s
(Dilek Aykut, Himmat Kalsi, and Dilip
Ratha 2003). And while developing coun-
tries’ ratios of external debt to equity fell
between 1997 and 2001, it is still not clear
that they have fallen to prudent levels (Philip
Suttle 2003, p. 9). Hence, the recent
increase in portfolio equity and FDI inflows
notwithstanding, developing countries still
lean heavily toward debt.50
The observed pattern of debt and equity
flows is an equilibrium outcome, resulting
from the optimal response of borrowers and
lenders to a given set of institutional
arrangements. Therefore, the critical issue is
what distortions in the international financial
system produce incentives that lead to so
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much debt and so little equity. One promi-
nent example of an incentive-distorting insti-
tutional arrangement was the Basel Capital
Accord of 1988 (Basel I).
Drafted in response to the 1980s debt cri-
sis, Basel I tried to reduce systemic risk by
linking banks’ capital adequacy ratios to the
riskiness of their loans. Under Basel I, banks
had to set aside capital equal to at least 8
percent of their risk-adjusted assets to pro-
vide a buffer in case of a loss on those assets.
The problem was that Basel I’s system for
risk-adjusting assets created an unintention-
al bias toward short-term lending to emerg-
ing markets. Lending to banks in OECD
countries received a 20 percent risk weight-
ing regardless of the maturity structure of
the loan. For loans to non-OECD countries,
short-term loans received a 20 percent
weight, long-term loans a 100 percent
weight (Rudi Bonte 1999).
As a consequence of Basel I’s weighting
system, short-term, foreign currency lending
to banks in emerging markets required only
one fifth of the capital required of long-term
loans to banks in emerging markets and no
more capital than a long-term loan to a bank
in an OECD country. Skewing the incentive
structure for banks in G-10 countries to lend
short-term to emerging markets had pre-
dictable consequences. As discussed in sec-
tion 8.1, short-term, dollar-denominated
loans, most of which originated with
European and Japanese banks, constituted
the lion’s share of debt contracts in the East
Asian Crisis. The eventual implementation of
Basel II may help alleviate the bias toward
short-term debt in Basel I, but Rogoff (1999)
identifies three other sources of debt bias in
the international financial system not directly
related to capital adequacy ratios.
First, by making it less risky to hold
deposits, deposit insurance in creditor and
debtor countries increases the deposit base
and expands the size of the banking system.
Implicit subsidies are also a problem. As the
size of banking system expands, it becomes
increasingly difficult for the government to
credibly commit to not bail out the banking
system in the event of a financial meltdown
(George A. Akerlof and Pual M. Romer
1993). Somewhat perversely, deposit insur-
ance may also raise the probability of bank
failures by reducing the incentive for depos-
itors to monitor the lending practices of the
financial institutions where they keep their
money.51
Second, the international financial system
protects the rights of debt holders more vig-
ilantly than those of equity holders. G-7
lenders to emerging-market countries can
resort to G-7 courts in the event of a debt
dispute, but there is no such avenue of
recourse for G-7 holders of emerging-mar-
ket equity (Bulow 2002; Rogoff 1999;
Obstfeld 1998).
Third, the underdevelopment of equity
markets in emerging economies exacerbates
the problem of preferential treatment of
debtholders in G-7 courts. The point here is
closely related to the discussion in section
6.1.3. A lack of transparency in emerging
equity markets makes foreigners reluctant to
invest, and weak protection of the rights of
equity investors reinforces the tendency of
capital suppliers to purchase debt instead of
equity (Henry and Peter Lombard
Lorentzen 2003).
9. Conclusion
Writing about capital account liberaliza-
tion in 1998, Bhagwati threw down the
gauntlet, declaring “It is time to shift the
burden of proof from those who oppose to
those who favor liberated capital” (Bhagwati
1998). The explosion of papers written on
the subject since that time indicates the seri-
ousness with which the profession has taken
his challenge.
There is little evidence that economic
growth and capital account openness are
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positively correlated across countries. But
there is lots of evidence that opening the
capital account leads countries to temporar-
ily invest more and grow faster than they did
when their capital accounts were closed.
Why does so much of the literature focus on
the relationship between openness and long-
run growth when the predictions of the neo-
classical model all point toward the
short-run impact of a country opening up?
Part of the answer is tradition. Cross-sec-
tional regressions of national growth rates on
policy variables have been around for a
while, so the gravitational pull of that
methodological approach is quite strong.
But I also think that the answer has some-
thing to do with a professional obsession.
There has always been a great deal of inter-
est in uncovering policies that increase the
steady-state rate of growth. As a conse-
quence, economists tend to ignore the
importance of short-run increases that per-
manently raise the path of national income
to a higher but parallel trajectory (Harberger
2005; Solow 2000, pp. 182–83).
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